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Purpose:  The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse if there are any 
significant differences in target shareholder return between 
friendly and hostile takeover bids on the Scandinavian market. 
We also intend to investigate the differences between hostile and 
friendly bid characteristics, and determine to what extent these 
differences can be explained by; firm relatedness, method of 
payment, time horizon, deal completeness and the acquiring 
firms’ geographical location. 
 
Theoretical perspective:  Theories used are partially previous research, partially well 
known theories within M&A and Corporate Finance literature.  
 
Method:  We analyse return to target shareholders by calculating 
Cumulative Abnormal Return using two models; Market Adjusted 
Return Model and Market Model. We compute CAR for six 
short-term event windows for Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway. 
Two types of benchmark has been used, Affärsvärlden General 
Index (AFGX) and Oslo Stock Exchange General Index 
(OSLOASH).  
 
Empirical findings:  Our study is quantitative and based on a sample of 267 public 
takeover attempts, of which 48 are hostile, during 2000-2010. 
This sample has been analysed by dummies in linear regressions 
for Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway separately.   
 
Conclusion:  Hostile takeovers, compared to friendly takeovers, have created 
approximately 4,5-8,5 per cent higher abnormal returns for target 
shareholders, on the Scandinavian market during 2000-2010. The 
result is statistically significant. No significance has been found 
on the explanatory variables that have been used in order to 
explain this over performance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is our intention to first introduce the reader to the topic and why it is worth investigation. 
Then, we will present our purpose and clarify what this study intends to achieve.  
1.1. Background 
Acquisitions became increasingly popular during the 1970s and 1980s (Harrison, Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991) and the frequency of Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) is 
dependent on business cycles. Since 1960 there have been several cycles where M&A activity 
have increased significantly. One of the most recent booms was the dotcom boom in the end 
of the 20
th
 century. In 1998, the total deal value of M&A activity was 2 052 billion dollars, 
five times higher than in 1993. Furthermore, in 1999 the M&A deal value peaked at 3 095 
billion dollars, almost 90 times higher compared to the level twenty years before (Goedhart, 
Koller, & Wessels, 2000).  
Another example can be found in the recent financial crisis. Since the financial crisis that 
escalated in late 2008 after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the frequency of M&A dropped 
significantly and the whole industry experienced a recession. In Sweden the number of target 
companies bought by foreign acquirers decreased by more than 50 per cent during 2008-2009 
(United Nations, 2010). However, according to a study made by KPMG and MergerMarket, 
78 per cent of the respondents predicted an increased M&A activity in the Nordic region 
during 2011 (KPMG, 2011).  
Besides the growing M&A activity there are also indications of a changed approach and 
attitude towards the M&A business. Nowadays, so-called hostile bids, bids that are not 
discussed with or not recommended by the target company’s board of directors, are more 
usual than ever. Jan Olsson, Global Banking Nordic Chief at Deutsche Bank said in 2007 
“…it is not as big of defeat today, compared to ten years ago, if a bid does not get accepted”. 
He further stated “…companies today are therefore more willing to place a bid without 
discussing it with or getting it approved by the target company’s board” (Fröberg, & 
Cervenka, 2007). 
This new hostile approach is nowadays not only attributable to firms that are related to each 
other, private equity firms and different holding companies have also developed this attitude. 
Private equity, investment and holding companies have made more than 50 per cent of the 
public hostile takeovers on the Scandinavian market since 2007. 
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1.2. Problem Discussion  
It has been discussed and debated in decades whether or not M&A create value. There are 
essentially two questions that previous research has tried to answer: (i) Do acquirer 
shareholders earn positive abnormal returns from M&A, and (ii) do target shareholders earn 
positive abnormal returns from M&A? (Kargin, 2001)  
Regarding the abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders, the results from previous 
research have varied. Some results have shown low or no abnormal return (Jarrell, Brickley, 
& Jeffrey, 1988), whereas, some studies have shown a negative abnormal return (Agrawal, 
Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; O'Sullivan, & Tuch, 2007). Moreover, Bishaar, Knight and van 
Wassenaer (2001) implied that over 50 per cent of the M&A in Europe and America failed to 
create shareholder value.  
On the contrary, most studies have shown evidence that M&A create positive abnormal 
returns to target shareholders. Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dodd (1980), Frank, Harris and 
Titman (1991) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) provided evidence for this in their studies on 
the U.S. market. To explain these positive abnormal returns for target shareholders different 
variables have been used such as; deal successfulness, relatedness, deal payment method, 
country of acquirer and whether or not the deal was made during a boom or bust period. 
Another variable that have been used to explain the size of the target shareholder return is if 
the bid was friendly or hostile. Franks and Mayer (1996) show, that hostile bids generate a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 30 per cent whereas friendly bids generate a CAR of 18 
per cent on the U.S market. Similarly, Servaes (1991), show on the US market, that hostile 
bids generate 32 per cent return to target shareholders whereas friendly bids only generate 22 
per cent. Do hostile bids generate higher return on other markets, and more specifically – why 
do hostile bids generate higher return than friendly bids? DePamphilis (2010) argue that 
hostile bids may require a higher bid premium to target shareholders in order for the 
shareholders to approve the deal and in order for the post-merger integration process to be as 
smooth and efficient as possible. Except for such managerial integration incentives, what 
other bid characteristics explain the difference between friendly and hostile return to target 
shareholders? To our knowledge there has neither been such a previous study on the 
Scandinavian market nor has it been any studies made during our timeframe, 2000-2010. We 
believe that such a study would be very interesting especially due to the new approach and 
attitude toward the hostile M&A business combined with the positive future forecast of the 
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Scandinavian M&A market. As mentioned, Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) among others, 
proved that the overall positive abnormal returns to target shareholder could be appointed to 
specific variables. Consequently, we would like to raise the question; to what extent can these 
previous mentioned variables explain the higher return in hostile takeovers?  
1.3. Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse if there are any significant short-term differences 
in target shareholder return between friendly and hostile takeovers bids on the Scandinavian 
market. We also intend to investigate the differences between hostile and friendly bid 
characteristics, and determine to what extent these differences can be explained by; deal 
successfulness, deal relatedness, payment method, country of acquirer and whether or not the 
deal was made during a boom or bust period. 
1.4. Demarcations  
Our original idea was to conduct a study on the entire Scandinavian market, but since there 
were too few hostile deals (three) in Denmark, our study is limited to Sweden and Norway. 
Still, we believe that our results will reflect the Scandinavian market rather well since the 
deals made in Sweden and Norway represent 94 per cent of the Scandinavian hostile bids and 
almost 89 per cent of the entire Scandinavian M&A market. This will be discussed further in 
section 3.1. 
In order for us to measure target shareholder return the target company must be publicly 
listed. We have therefore chosen to examine takeovers on firms that have been or are 
currently publicly traded on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm or Oslo Stock Exchange.  
As mentioned in the problem discussion, return to target shareholders is dependent on how the 
bidders value the target company and the potential synergies that may arise from the deal. 
However, this thesis will not consider the actual valuation process of a company, nor will it 
consider the valuation process of potential synergy effects. Additionally, unlike similar 
studies, performed on other markets, e.g. Schoenberg and Thornton (2006), our study will not 
account for post-bid defence tactics by the target company on hostile takeover attempts. This 
due to the fact that this variable has no substantial significance to our study, since we in our 
sample do not include any raised or contested bids within our event windows.  
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Additionally, Holl (1977) argue that one of the reasons to why hostile bids generate higher 
returns than friendly bids depends on the bid resistance from target management. He further 
aims to distinguish hostile and friendly performance by determining why bid resistance occur. 
Such variables are according to Holl; target management holdings in target firm, bidder 
holdings in target firm, whether or not high managerial holdings exists and whether or not 
bidding firm has a high debt level. However, this study aims to measure short-term 
announcement effects and, consequently, does not include any revised bids within our event 
windows. Subsequently, the variables investigated by Holl will have minor impact on our 
result, which is why they are not regarded in this study. This will be discussed in our analysis. 
We want to analyse and determine why hostile bids generate higher return than friendly bids, 
not why an acquirer should choose a friendly or hostile bid attitude. Even though the two may 
be correlated to some extent, we have chosen not to investigate variables regarding the latter. 
Morck, Shleifner and Vishnu (1988) argue that the difference between friendly and hostile 
target companies is e.g. target ownership structure and target financial characteristics such as 
relative size of target and bidder. Consequently, we have chosen not to include any of these 
variables in our study. Our study will instead focus on different variables that previous 
research has confirmed affect target shareholder return positively, and moreover to see if any 
of these variables can be attributable to hostile takeovers in specific. Due to this reason we 
will neither consider to what extent hostile takeovers are industry specific as Georgen and 
Renneboog (2003) did. We will instead use firm relatedness as a variable as Shelton (2000) 
did when he explained positive returns to target shareholders. This is further explained and 
discussed in section 2.4. 
Lastly, we have chosen to start our study in the year of 2000 due to the absence of hostile 
acquisitions prior to that year and since the information availability in databases is stronger 
during the 21
st
 century. 
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2. LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The M&A literature have through the history been thoroughly discussed. It is our intention to 
widely inform the reader of previous research as well as existing theories within the M&A 
field. At the end of this chapter our hypothesis will present and discuss our hypotheses. 
2.1. Mergers & Acquisitions 
The definition of a merger is when “two or more enterprises cease to be distinct enterprises 
and agree to combine their equity capital to form a single new company” (Hussey, 1999, p. 
54). The merging firm is the initiative taker to the merger with another company, the target. 
The merging firm must purchase the stock or existing assets of the target firm either with cash 
or something of equivalent value. Such a value can for example be shares in the new 
corporation in exchange for old shares, for a specified rate (Berk, & DeMarzo, 2007; Hussey, 
1999). In order to succeed with a merger, both the board and the shareholders of the target 
company must accept the offer; hence the decision is mutual. The board of directors must 
however accept the deal in order for shareholders to get a chance to vote.  
An acquisition is when “one company buy sufficient shares in another company to give the 
purchaser control of that company” (Hussey, 1999, p. 54). In contrast to a merger, an 
acquisition does not have to be a mutual decision between the board and shareholders. It is in 
this case completely up to the target company’s shareholders to either accept or reject the bid 
from the acquiring company. An acquisition can hence be friendly or hostile depending on the 
consensus between the board and shareholders of the target firm. Furthermore, an acquisition 
can be public or private depending on whether or not any of the firms involved are listed. 
However, in order for a merger or acquisition to be completed, at least 50 per cent of the 
target firm shareholders must vote in favour of the deal. Further on, we will use the terms 
mergers, acquisitions and M&A interchangeably throughout the thesis. However, when we 
specifically mean hostile and friendly takeovers, this will be specified. 
2.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis and Acquisition Announcements 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) was introduced by Fama (Fama, 1970), where he 
divided the market into three different kinds of efficiency; weak, semi-strong and strong 
efficiency. In a weak form of efficiency the market prices fully reflect all historical 
information. In a semi-strong efficiency all public available information is incorporated in the 
security price. This implies that an acquisition announcement today will affect the stock price 
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tomorrow. However, if there is a strong efficiency, all information, both public and private, 
will be incorporated in the stock price. An acquisition announcement will therefore be 
predicted by the market and consequently not change the security price. In this form of 
efficiency, not even insiders can expect to earn abnormal returns. 
EMH is an often-debated theory and the question of which form of efficiency that exists on 
the market has great relevance for this thesis. It is the authors’ opinion that there is a 
probability that there is information about the target company only being attributable to its 
board and management and therefore not fully incorporated in the stock price. Consequently, 
a target company’s board and shareholders may have different opinions about the premium 
presented in a bid. Furthermore, since there in perfect capital markets (strong efficiency) are 
no possibilities for abnormal returns, the authors’ of this thesis assume a semi-strong 
efficiency where the stock prices today reflect all public available information, but when/if 
new information (e.g. acquisition announcements) becomes available in the future, the price 
of the security should be based on that information. (Fama, 1970) 
2.3. Incentives for M&A 
2.3.1. Growth  
Growth is one of the most known motives for M&A. Organic or internal growth is usually 
very slow, expensive and highly uncertain. Firms can, however, better control their growth in 
desired direction compared to the second alternative; M&A growth, which is a more rapid and 
uncertain process where the firms acquire a target with enough satisfying qualities. (Gaughan, 
2007) M&A is a powerful tool for managers to show the industry of growth, especially in 
industries where products and services growth are slowing down. Additional features of M&A 
are the synergy effects, further described in 2.3.2., that can improve the profitability of the 
entire enterprise. However, growth is not favourable for the enterprise value if the return on 
investments does not live up to previous ratios. Management needs to have this in mind when 
deciding future growth prospects and not only concentrate on growth ratios.  (Gaughan, 2007)  
2.3.2. Synergies   
The most well known incentive for M&A is to exploit potential synergies. Synergy is a 
reaction of two factors that together produce a greater effect than the aggregated effect they 
would produce independently. In mergers, it is the ability to become more profitable by 
cooperation than to for two firms to operate on their own. This is often referred to as the 
phenomenon of two plus two is equal to five.  
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Synergies can be classified as operating, managerial or financial (Sudarsnam 1996; Boateng, 
& Uddin, 2009). The operating synergies can refer to the acquirer’s ability to exploit 
economics of scale or scope by e.g. overlap activities or marketing with the target company. 
In order for these synergies to be possible it requires that firms are either horizontal or vertical 
related. If the firms instead are unrelated, financial synergies can be achieved. The financial 
synergies are non-operating and refer to mergers of unrelated firms where the synergies are of 
financial nature. There are several sources of financial synergy: tax advantages of unused debt 
capacity, lowered cost of capital and transaction costs, and a more efficient debt coinsurance 
of the two companies. The third type of synergy, managerial synergy, can be referred to both 
related and unrelated deals. Managerial synergies could arise when an acquirer take over a 
target with less competent managers. Such a disciplinary takeover is expected to be value 
creating for both the acquirer and target company (DePamphilis, 2010; Sudarsnam, 1996) 
2.3.3. Diversification 
The term diversification is a strategy of acquiring a firm outside the core business line.  It 
further refers to the argument of shifting either from its core product lines into new product 
lines or from old markets into new markets with higher growth potential. A firm can either 
diversify to related or unrelated products or markets; however, they need to weigh the 
increased risk by entering unfamiliar products or markets against the potential return these 
increased risk may evoke. (Boateng, & Uddin, 2009; DePamphilis, 2010)  
2.3.4. Hubris, Misvaluation and “Winners curse” 
Hubris or excessive overconfidence by management can result in a belief that its own 
valuation of the target firm is superior the market’s valuation. If the managers are over-
optimistic over the expected synergies that can be created, they tend to misvalue the target 
and overpay for the firm. (Roll, 1986) Hubris and misvaluation is related to the well-known 
expression winners curse. The acquiring firm with the winning bid experiences the winners 
curse when it misvaluates the target but still is satisfied to have acquired the firm, thus is the 
party willing to pay the most for the target´s expected value. (Goedhart, Koller, & Wessels, 
2005; DePamphilis, 2010).  
2.3.5. Buying Undervalued Assets (Tobin’s q-ratio) 
Firms with expansion ambitions can either choose to invest in a new plant and more 
equipment or acquire a company with equivalent assets. If replacement costs of new assets 
exceed the market value of a company with equivalent assets, the q-ratio is less than one. 
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Hence, the q-ratio is explained as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of its 
assets (Chung, & Pruitt, 1994). Firms searching for replacement of assets can by using the  
Q-ratio acquire targets, fulfilling their requirements, at a lower cost than investing on its own. 
Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) discovered that acquirers with high q-ratio is benefical for 
aquiring firm and vice versa. Pangarkar and Lie (2004; cited in Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davidson, 2009) further found that equity market cycles are 
important for shareholders since managers are less likely overpay in downturns.  
2.3.6. Agency Problem   
Agency problems and arise when the managers do not act in the favour of the firm’s 
shareholders; instead they act in their own interest. This is the so-called principal-agent 
problem, where shareholders are the principals and management is the agent. The function of 
management is, from an economical point of view, to maximize shareholder value 
(DePamphilis, 2010). However, management may instead rather focus more on matters that 
benefit their own interests, such as job security, high bonuses, empire-buildings and immortal 
reputation. This may appear when ownership in a firm is widely spread; since the costs for 
mismanagement are spread across a large numbers of shareholders it can be tolerated for 
longer periods. Principal-agent theory considers M&A to be a corrector, as they unite the 
interest of managers and shareholders into shared interests. (DePamphilis, 2010) Furthermore, 
to decrease the principal-agent problem and minimise agency costs, ownership and control 
should be unified. This is in line with the incentive realignment hypothesis, and will lead to 
higher managerial incentives and increased efforts to maximize firm value (Renneboog, 
Simons, & Wright, 2007).  
2.3.7. Tax Considerations 
Tax is considered as an M&A motive for especially two reasons. However, tax laws changes 
year-to-year and country-to-country, which implies that a deal can be more or less tax 
beneficial depending on the geographical location of the target and acquiring company. The 
first tax reason is the usage of loss carry forwards. Acquiring firm can by acquire an 
unprofitable firm take advantage of its taxable loss, since the consolidated firms income will 
be lower leading to reduced tax bill. This acquisition is only gainful if synergies can be 
exploited in the future. (Hillier, Grinblatt, & Titman, 2008) Second, the M&A transaction can 
be classified as tax-free, and this is sometimes a necessity in order for the acquirer to pursue 
the transaction. If the transaction is not tax-free the target normally require a higher 
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purchasing price, which the buyer cannot afford, to compensate for the tax-liability resulting 
from the acquisition. (Gaughan, 2007) 
2.3.8. Market Power 
Haleblian et al. (2009) mention that market power is a reason for M&A. However, even 
though there is limited evidence in previous research, one can argue from the market 
hypothesis, that fewer firms means more market power per firm in the industry. If there are 
few firms in the industry, pricing power by each firm increases. In an industry with one 
superior firm, with a monopolistic position, this firm is price setter and decides the rules other 
opponents have to oblige. Merger types that may increase such market power are especially 
horizontal and vertical mergers.  
2.4. Merger Types and Firm Relatedness 
The most well renowned types of mergers are the horizontal, vertical and conglomerate 
mergers. (Lubatkin, 1983).  
2.4.1. Horizontal Mergers 
Horizontal mergers are when two companies that operate in similar lines of activity are 
united. The two key motives for this kind of mergers are to achieve economies of scale and to 
reduce competition by enhancing the market power of the acquiring firm. (Arnold, 2008) 
Horizontal mergers can, depending on the size, be highly regulated. Such mergers need to be 
approved by the authorities to be completed; since horizontal mergers decreases the numbers 
of firms in the industry. Fewer firms in the industry lead to negative effect on competition, 
monopoly profits and possible collusion by the leading firms. (Miychell, Mulherin, & 
Weston, 2004)  
2.4.2. Vertical Mergers 
Vertical mergers are a fusion of firms from different stages in the production chain. These 
vertical mergers can be downstream or upstream. Downstream is e.g. when a manufacturer 
merges with a retailer and upstream e.g. when a manufacturer merges with a raw material 
production firm. Hence, a manufacturing firm can by a vertical merger both secure their 
supply of raw material and reduce costs, related to administration, transportation and 
production. (Arnold, 2008) Authorities also need to revise such mergers since they can create 
negative competition, when e.g. there is only one supplier of a raw material and this firm 
wants to merge with a producer of a certain product that is dependent on this raw material. 
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Even though this merger may create great value for the end customer, it will probably be 
cancelled since it will harm the competition for this certain product due to producer 
discrimination. (Motta, 2009)  
2.4.3. Conglomerate Mergers 
Conglomerate mergers are simply mergers of two firms that operate in unrelated business 
areas (Arnold, 2008). Hence, these firms are not competitors and do not have a buyer-seller 
relationship (Gaughan, 2007). One of the key motives for such merger is some kind of risk 
reduction by diversification (Arnold, 2008). Conglomerate mergers can be distinguished into 
three subtypes. First, concentric mergers are product extension mergers that widen the current 
product lines. Second, mergers involving two firms with operations in non-overlapping 
geographic areas are called geographic market extension mergers. Third, other conglomerate 
mergers include investment companies, managerial conglomerates and financial conglomerate 
that involve unrelated business activities. (Miychell, Mulherin, & Weston, 2004) However, 
compared to financial conglomerates, one could argue that investment company deals and 
managerial conglomerates, to some extent, are partially linked. The only motive behind 
financial mergers are capital structure motives and compared to all other classes of mergers, 
financial mergers are the most unrelated. Therefore, we have chosen to classify financial 
mergers as an own category in our sample, along with horizontal, vertical and  other 
conglomerate deals. 
2.5. Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers 
An attempt to acquire another firm can either be viewed from the target’s side as friendly or 
hostile. A takeover attempt is considered as friendly if the target´s board of directors propose 
a deal or do not reject a proposed bid (Morck et al., 1988). If the board of directors believe 
that the proposed bid is in-line with the interest of the firm´s shareholders, they will open up 
for a further dialog of a possible takeover. Generally, an acquiring company need to offer a 
purchase premium to succeed with an acquisition; this is the difference between the purchase 
price and the target´s pre-acquisition stock price (Haleblian et al., 2009). The size of the 
purchasing premium generally includes all potential synergy effects minus the costs for the 
acquisition. (DePamphilis, 2010; Morck et al., 1988) 
Hostile takeover attempts are either deals that not are recommended by the target’s board of 
directors or deals that are addressed directly to the target company’s shareholders. A hostile 
bid can be done either directly through a hostile tender offer or by open market through the 
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public stock exchange. In order for a hostile acquisition to be accepted by the target firm 
shareholder’s, the before mentioned premium is usually higher for hostile acquisitions than 
for friendly acquisitions. Most transactions are, however, friendly because the post-merger 
integration process can be initiated more smoothly and more efficiently if both parties 
cooperate fully. (DePamphilis, 2010; Morck et al., 1988; )  
2.5.1. Management Entrenchment Theory 
A target that is exposed to a hostile takeover might use defence mechanisms such as poison 
pills, greenmail, golden parachutes white knights and white squire to defend themselves 
(Gaughan, 2007). According to management entrenchment theory, management practise such 
protection methods to ensure their retention within the firm (DePamphilis, 2010). However, 
such defences do not always prevent a takeover attempt, especially if the firm is mismanaged 
and has a low valuation. The acquiring firm may thus consider a high premium to remove the 
management to succeed with the acquisition. Consequently, hostile takeovers can be a useful 
way to management replacement, which indirectly increases target shareholder value (Morck 
et al., 1988).  
2.5.2. Shareholder’s Interest Theory 
This theory proposes that target shareholders’ may benefit from management resistance to a 
proposed takeover (DePamphilis, 2010). Previous research has found that benefits are higher 
in successful hostile bids than unsuccessful hostile bids. Franks and Mayer (1996) proved on 
the U.K market that, during the bid month, hostile successful bids had a premium of 29,8 per 
cent compared to 21,5 per cent for unsuccessful bids. Hence, management resistance can be a 
bargaining strategy to achieve higher benefits for target shareholders (DePamphilis, 2010; 
Franks, & Mayer, 1996).   
2.6. Methods of Payment  
Method of payment in M&A, viewed from the target shareholders, is generally cash, stock or 
a combination of them both. Cash occurs mostly in cash tender offers and cash mergers. The 
target´s shareholders swap their stocks at tender offer expiration date for a predetermined 
amount of cash per each stock held.  In a stock merger, the acquiring and target firm negotiate 
how many shares the target firm’s shareholders will receive in the acquiring firm for each 
share held in the target. A stock merger can be announced as 1:4 or 0.25, meaning one 
acquiring firm share in exchange for four target firm shares. As mentioned, target firm’s 
shareholders may also receive a combination of both cash and stock as settlement. (Miychell, 
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Mulherin, & Weston, 2004) The payment method with the highest CAR, from target 
shareholders’ point of view, is cash offers. Average CAR for cash offers was 29,3 per cent 
compared to 14,4 per cent for stock offers during 1977-1982 (Huang, & Walking, 1987). 
Additionally, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) presented evidence of 20,1 per cent 
return for cash and 13,0 per cent for stock offers during 1973-1998 on the U.S market. 
2.6.1. Information Asymmetries 
As mentioned in 2.2., financial markets have strong efficiency when all information available 
is fully reflected in market prices. However, it can be assumed that management probably do 
not share all information to the market. Information that will be advantageous for 
management and/or shareholders will for certain be publicly spread but, on the other hand, 
information that the management believe could harm the enterprise would not be spread. Due 
to this dilemma, the market seems to be not fully efficient and information asymmetries exist 
between management and the market. (Yook, 2003)  
2.6.2. Trade-off Theory 
Capital structure of a firm consists of equity and debt or debt equivalents. There are several 
reasons behind choosing equity ahead of debt and vice versa. One reason for choosing debt is 
its tax-deductibility on interest expenses, creating what is usually called a tax-shield. Reason 
for choosing equity is that when having debt, you will need to pay interest to borrowing party 
annually. This is mandatory for a corporation and if this cannot be met, borrowing party may 
force the corporation into Chapter 11 – bankruptcy. Since you do not need to pay annual or 
monthly interest to shareholders, there is low probability of bankruptcy and low financial 
distress costs associated with a pure equity firm. When deciding what capital structure your 
corporation should have, you will need to take the trade-off theory in mind, by balancing tax 
advantages against the costs of financial distress (Myers, 2001). 
2.6.3. Pecking Order Theory and Signalling Hypothesis 
Related to trade-off theory is the pecking order theory, which states that companies prioritize 
its sources of financing of investments. The concept can be simplified as; issue safe securities 
in front of risky ones since it usually implies lower issuing costs. For that reason, use internal 
financing first such as retained earnings. If external financing however is required, the 
company should issue debt or debt equivalent securities. Of last resort, since this is the most 
expensive, the company should issue equity. (Myers, & Majluf, 1984) The signalling 
hypothesis assumes that information asymmetries exist and that management chose financing 
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structure depending on announcement reactions (Yook, 2003). The selected financing 
structure implies management’s belief of the firm’s market value. Stock as payment method 
implies stock overvaluation of the acquirer and cash as method implies undervaluation 
(Myers, & Majluf, 1984). 
2.6.4. Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the cash flow in excess of all funds required for 
projects with a positive net present value, discounted by a relevant cost of capital. The most 
commonly used methods to distribute such free cash flow are dividends or stock-repurchases. 
However, managers might, instead of distributing free cash flow to shareholders invest in 
projects with negative net present value.  Jensen (1986) argues that the free cash flow problem 
could be solved by increasing the debt level of a firm, since it diminishes the agency costs due 
to increased interest expenses, which in turn decreases the free cash flow that managers can 
spend on bad investments. One way for managers to spend cash, instead of paying liquid 
assets out to shareholders, is acquisitions. Hence, cash acquisitions are more commonly used 
for firms with high free cash flow than for firms with low free cash flow. Jensen’s (1986) free 
cash flow theory further predicted that takeover financed with cash generates larger benefits 
for the acquirer compared to stock acquisitions, since free cash flow will be reduced. In the 
end, an acquirer’s choice to pay for an acquisition with cash or equity is affected by the trade-
off and pecking order theory as well as Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis. We will later 
conclude that target shareholder return is dependable on which type of payment the acquirer 
chooses. Target shareholder return is thus also dependable on the different theories affecting 
the payment choice. 
2.7. Domestic versus Cross-border Takeover 
When a company faces increased competition and the market is getting more mature, the 
organic growth rate might sometimes be difficult to preserve at a high level. Acquisitions can 
be an alternative in order to keep growing and not lose market shares to other faster moving 
(acquiring) competitors. Making acquisitions can thus be a way of gaining market share by 
expanding into new markets or new regions (cross-border acquisitions). However, it is 
important to consider that the bigger a firm gets, the more difficult it becomes managing. 
(Gaughan, 2007)  
The merger waves of 1980s and 1990s differed from previous waves in terms of cross-border 
acquisitions. On a global level, cross border acquisitions, from 1986 to 2000, accounted for  
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26 per cent of the value of total acquisitions. By 2000, the global value of cross-border 
acquisitions were two per cent of world wide GDP, compared to a half per cent in the mid-
1980s. Additionally, in 2000 they accounted for over 80 per cent of all foreign direct 
investments. Consequently, cross-border acquisitions had revolutionized the M&A market 
and were the leading strategy of internationalization for companies. (Conn, Cosh, Guest, & 
Hughes, 2005 ; United Nations, 2000) 
A cross-border acquisition enables the acquirer to access the target company’s distribution 
channels and knowhow, which could make it a less risky way than expanding on their own. 
However, by comparison with domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions have more 
possible barriers to entry e.g. political, customs, language and cultural differences that have to 
be overcome. These barriers could decrease possible synergy effects to the acquirer and 
consequently lower the bid premium to the target company’s shareholders. On the contrary, 
Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2003) argue that cross-border acquisitions instead could 
generate higher synergies than domestic acquisitions. This due to diversification synergies 
arising from intangible and information based assets such as brand names, R&D expenditure 
and technical knowledge from the target company. Moreover, Finkelstein and Larsson (1999) 
argue that cross-border acquisitions can affect an M&A in three ways. First, cross-border 
M&A can inhibit the needed coordination and interaction, from an organisational perspective, 
due to financial, legal and other country differences (Lindgren, 1982; Marks, & Mirvis, 1993; 
cited in Finkelstein et al., 1990, pg 8). Second, cross-border M&A can intensify cultural 
clashes, from an HRM perspective, and promote employee resistance (Calori, & Lubatkin, 
1994; Kogut, & Singh, 1988; Very, 1994; cited in Finkelstein et al., 1999, pg 8). Finally, 
cross-border M&A may, from a strategic perspective, quicken access to new markets and 
contribute to globalisation synergies (Forsgren, 1989; Olie, 1990; cited in Finkelstein et al., 
1999, pg 8). However, it is likely to believe that a cross-border M&A has a higher chance to 
succeed if the acquiring company gets the target company’s management and board approval. 
In order to get the approval and make the transaction as smooth as possible, a higher bid 
premium, compared to domestic transactions, could be motivated.  
2.8. Regulations Related to Mergers & Acquisitions 
Information in a public takeover attempt should be available at the same time for all investors 
and stakeholders, in order to have an efficient market and absence of arbitrageurs. To enforce 
these conditions, an acquiring firm needs to follow a very strict procedure when making a 
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takeover bid or a merger proposal. It is our intention to briefly inform the reader of some rules 
and regulations that can be helpful when further reading and to get a general knowledge of the 
procedure on the Norwegian and the Swedish Stock Exchanges. (Oslo Börs, 2008; Nasdaq 
OMX, 2009)   
An acquisition offer for a public traded firm may only be placed after certain preparations, 
which controls that, the buyer has the ability to fulfil given proposal. As soon as possible after 
the offering, a press release with names, financing structure, buyer’s current shareholding, 
price premium etc. should be published. Within a period of four weeks after the 
announcement, the acquirer needs to apply for an approval of its offer at the regulators of the 
target´s Stock Exchange. Within two weeks before the bids term of acceptance expire, target 
firm´s board of directors need to make a statement whether they recommend the offer or not. 
Term of acceptance for the target´s shareholders, the timeframe for deciding to accept or 
declining the offer, may vary between three to ten weeks. Regarding target shareholders’ 
compensation, identical conditions should be offered for identical stock type. After the term 
of acceptance has expired, the acquirer need to publish the amount of shares they own after 
acquisition, if all terms were successfully fulfilled, when the payment to the target´s 
shareholders will begin and other relevant deal information. (Oslo Börs, 2008; Nasdaq OMX, 
2009) 
If a firm acquires over a certain amount of the outstanding shares, the acquirer is obliged to 
present an offer to acquire all the remaining shares of the company. A mandatory bid is 
triggered if a person through an acquisition becomes owner of more than 1/3 of the voting 
shares in a Norwegian listed company. Equivalent trigger is 30 per cent of the voting shares in 
a Swedish listed company. The mandatory offer price has at least to be equivalent to the 
volume-based average of the share price during the last 20 trading days and it should be 
presented no later than four weeks after the mandatory offer obligation was triggered. Another 
trigger is 90 per cent, which is the minimum amount of the outstanding shares the acquirer 
needs to possess to delist the target from current stock exchange. (Oslo Börs, 2008; Nasdaq 
OMX, 2009)   
2.8.1. Run-up Abnormal Return 
Previously mentioned rules in, section 2.8, involved with M&A transactions, are very 
important for regulators to maintain, in order to have an efficient market. Since takeover 
attempts often involve several parties, such as financial advisers, lawyers, management and 
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board of directors in the acquiring firm; everything has to be strictly confidential. If leakage 
of information occurs, it is possible to use this and invest in for example target firm. Since a 
takeover usually involves a price premium for the target’s shareholders, as mentioned in 
section 2.5, investors with inside information can make arbitrage profits.  
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) found, during the so-called rumour run-up period, a seven-
percentage increase in the share price of target U.S firms for 20 trading days before the 
rumour was announced publicly. Looking at the pre-announcement run-up, instead of pre-
rumour, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found that approximately half of the market reaction 
occur prior the public date of announcement. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found along with 
the study of Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (2000), on the Canadian market, that the 
abnormal price performance pre-announcement is mainly due to trading by corporate insiders.  
2.9. Hypotheses  
2.9.1. Target Shareholder Return 
As further will be described in our method section, our null hypothesis, H0, and alternative 
hypothesis, H1, is whether or not target shareholder return is equal to zero. We chose to 
present the hypotheses, below, both here and in our method section in order to have a 
numerical order of the hypothesis.   
H0: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for target companies are equal to zero 
H1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for target companies are not equal to zero  
2.9.2. Hostile Takeovers 
As stated in the introduction and in section 2.3 hostile bids are bids that are either rejected by 
the target board of directors or not discussed with the target board before they are being made. 
According to earlier M&A literature, hostile takeovers are often carried through at a higher 
premium than friendly takeovers (DePamphilis, 2010). Supporting this, Frank and Harris 
(1989) and Sudarsnam, Holl and Salami (1996) found evidence of higher abnormal return 
during hostile takeovers than friendly takeovers in the U.K. and Franks, Harris and Titman 
(1991) concluded the same result on the U.S. market. We consequently want to test if this is 
the case on the Scandinavian market as well. In order for us to test this relationship we create 
a dummy variable, HOSTILE, for each deal in our sample, taking the value 0 if the deal is 
friendly and 1 if it is classified as hostile. Thus our second hypothesis is: 
23 
 
H2: Hostile takeover attempts generates higher return to target shareholders than friendly 
attempts 
All of the following hypothesis will be tested in four steps. First, we will test if the hypotheses 
hold for hostile bids. Second, we will test if they hold for friendly bids. Third, we will test if 
the hypotheses hold for the total sample in each country and finally we will test if they hold 
for the Scandinavian market. By following this method we will be able to see differences and 
similarities between friendly and hostile bids, differences and similarities between the 
countries and at the same time be able to make conclusions about the Scandinavian market. 
Moreover, since the hypotheses will be tested both for friendly and hostile bids as well for 
three different markets, they will be formulated in a general way. 
2.9.3. Deal Successfulness 
Previous studies have shown positive abnormal returns to completed proposals and negative 
returns to cancelled proposals i.e. (Dodd, 1980). However, DePamphilis (2010) argue that 
unsuccessful takeovers, i.e. bids that are not accepted and eventually cancelled, can result in 
positive abnormal return to target shareholders. He further argue that this only is possible 
around the announcement day since most of the return disappear if another bid does not 
appear. Consequently the authors want to examine if the market can predict if a bid will be 
successful or not. We believe this to be the case since target shareholders play a vital part in 
the final decision to whether the bid will be completed or not. 
H3: Successful bids generates higher return than unsuccessful bids  
To test this hypothesis we create another dummy variable, named SUCCESSFUL, assigned 
with the value of 1 if the deal is successful and 0 if the deal is unsuccessful. 
2.9.4. Deal Relatedness                                                   
It may be argued that higher bid premiums, and consequently higher return, are connected to 
horizontal and vertical mergers (related mergers), due to potential synergy effects. Georgen 
and Renneboog (2003) support this argument and further argue that an acquirer should not 
diversify by acquiring target firms that do not match their core business. However, it may also 
be argued that higher bid premiums are connected to conglomerate and financial mergers 
(unrelated mergers) since such mergers potentially can take advantage of a new capital 
structure and thus lower the cost of capital. Earlier studies have already tested if horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate deals are positively correlated to CAR. Hence, it is our intention to 
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modify earlier hypotheses to see which type of deal that generate the highest CAR. 
Consequently, our hypothesis is: 
H4: Unrelated M&A generates higher return for target shareholders than related M&A 
To test for this hypothesis we created a dummy variable, RELATED. We gave the deal a 0 if 
the deal was classified as vertical or horizontal and a dummy of 1 if the deal was classified as 
financial or conglomerate. 
2.9.5. Payment Method 
Goergen and Renneboog (2003) concludes that a payment from the acquirer where all or 
some parts are paid with equity generates negative abnormal return around the announcement 
for both the target and acquirer shareholders. When an equity bid is made, it signals to the 
market that the acquiring firm’s managers believe their shares are overpriced, and 
consequently the abnormal returns decrease for both partners. Furthermore, previous research 
has shown that all cash bids generate higher CAR to target shareholders than all equity bids as 
well as mixed method of payment, hybrid bids (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; 
Goergen, & Renneboog, 2003; Huang, & Walking, 1987). This is further strengthening by the 
pecking order theory presented by Myers (1984).  However, Chatterjee and Kuenzi (2001) 
argue that equity transactions are not seen as a negative signal by the market since it gives the 
target company incentives to make a success of the transaction. Consequently, we would like 
to test this dilemma with the following hypothesis: 
H5: Cash offers as payment method generates higher return to target shareholders compared 
to stock or hybrid offers. 
To test for this hypothesis we classify a deal dummy, named CASH, of 1 if it is an all-cash 
offer and 0 if it is not an all-cash offer. 
2.9.6. Boom or Bust Period 
Earlier M&A literature have reported that bidder gains fall during boom periods since 
managers are more likely to pay overprices (Shelton, 2000), which is also consistent with the 
hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986). Further, it can be argued that free cash flow is used for 
management empire building (Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991). This could be explained since 
it is believable that managers have higher excessive optimism and more liquid resources 
available during boom periods than bust periods (Shelton 2000). Consequently, for target 
companies this should imply the opposite; that target shareholder return is higher during boom 
25 
 
periods than bust periods. In contrast, Pangarkar and Lie (2004; cited in Haleblian et al., 
2009) argue that managers are less likely to overpay for acquisitions when equity market 
cycles are low. It can moreover also be argued that companies are more careful during bust 
periods and therefore choose to spend their money more wisely and thoughtfully. It can 
further be argued that companies have a relatively lower market to book value during bust 
periods. This relatively low market value can motivate acquirers to pay a larger price 
premium to the target shareholders. We would through this discussion like to test this 
dilemma and thus we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H6: Higher return is realised during bust periods compared to boom periods 
We created a dummy, named BOOM, with the value of 1 if the deal is conducted during a 
bust period and 0 if it is conducted during a boom period. Georgen and Rennebog (2003) 
applied a kind of boom versus bust variable in their study. They stated that the European 
M&A activity grew by more than 280 per cent in value during 1996-1999 but even more 
between 1999-2000. Consequently they divided their sample in two periods; the bids before 
1999 was classified as a sort of bust period, meanwhile the timeframe 1999-2000 was 
classified as a boom period. However, we have chosen a definition of boom when the market 
index has been positive during the last six month pre-announcement, and bust when the index 
has been negative. Six month has been chosen due to the fact that it takes several months of 
planning a takeover proposal and the current market situation can be important when making 
the proposal. Further, we chose to measure the change in market index instead of change in 
GDP since it is fewer measuring points for GDP compared to market index in Reuters 
DataStream, which for us was beneficial.   
2.9.7. Country of Acquirer 
As previously discussed in 2.7., cross-border acquisitions have more possible barriers to entry 
than domestic acquisitions due to cultural differences etc. These barriers could decrease the 
buyer’s potential synergy effects and consequently lower the price premium paid to the target. 
However, it is also argued that cross-border acquisitions generate higher diversification 
synergies than domestic acquisitions, which motivates a higher premium (Conn, Cosh, Guest, 
& Hughes, 2005). A high premium can further be motivated to minimize the resistance from 
target board and management in order to make the necessary implementations as smooth and 
successful as possible. Due to these arguments we would like to control what impact cross-
border acquisitions have, and therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
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H7: Cross-border M&A generate higher return to target shareholders than domestic M&A 
To test the hypothesis if cross-border M&A are more positive related to CAR than domestic 
M&A, we constructed a dummy, named CROSS, with a value of 0 if it is a domestic deal and 
1 if the acquirer is not a domestic one.  
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3. METHOD 
This section will thoroughly describe chosen methodological approach and describe data 
collection as well as discuss reliability and validity of chosen method.  
3.1. Research Approach 
In this thesis we have used a deductive approach (Backman, 2008). We began with collecting 
and understanding the theory about M&A, from which we then formulated hypotheses. We 
continued by statistically testing whether the hypotheses could be confirmed or not. Finally, 
the results were analysed, discussed and explained with regards to the theoretical framework. 
In the last step, there was a slight inductive approach since we could formulate new theories 
and hypotheses based on the results of the old ones (Bryman, & Bell, 2005). Furthermore, a 
quantitative research strategy was used in the study to test if M&A are creating abnormal 
returns for target firm’s shareholders and if this could be derived from any specific bid or deal 
determinants. Our original idea was to conduct a study on the entire Scandinavian market, but 
since there were too few hostile deals in Denmark (three), our study is limited to Sweden and 
Norway. Originally, we found 34 public takeover bids in Denmark, whereof three were 
hostile. Consequently, we believe that our choice to disregard Denmark still will reflect the 
Scandinavian market rather well since the public deals in Sweden and Norway represent 89 
per cent of the entire Scandinavian activity and almost 94 per cent of all Scandinavian hostile 
bids. To be able to measure abnormal return to target’ shareholders, we have chose to use an 
event study approach and in order for the reader to a better understanding of our method, we 
will describe our event study in the following sections.  
3.2. The Event Study 
The methodology of capital market oriented event studies was introduced by Fama (1970), 
and was further developed by e.g. Brown and Warner in 1980 and 1985. An event study 
measures the success of a transaction by analysing the abnormal return to the shareholders. 
The timeframe of the analyses can vary, but it is either measured instantly surrounding the 
public announcement of a transaction or measured directly after the announcement in a longer 
period (Wubben, 2007). The event study is, as mentioned before, based on a semi-strong 
efficiency where unanticipated events, such as an acquisition, affect the share price. The 
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procedure of an event study is essentially comprised by several steps (Wubben, 2007; 
MacKinlay, 1997): 
i. Define announcement day and “event-window”  
ii. Determine the normal return (= the expected return assuming that the acquisition 
never was announced) 
iii. Determine the abnormal return (=the difference between the actual and normal return) 
iv. Measure the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
 
i. Define announcement day and “event window” 
Event studies can provide knowledge of abnormal returns to the shareholders of the acquirer, 
the target company, or a combination of both. However, the purpose of this study is solely to 
measure the abnormal returns to the target company shareholders. The first step to measure 
this is to define the announcement day and the event window. The day when acquisitions 
become public is defined as the announcement day (Brown, & Warner, 1985; Wubben, 2007). 
Furthermore, the event window is the days surrounding the announcement day capturing the 
stock price changes, which a public announcement (assuming a semi-strong efficiency) results 
in. Similar to several reviewed studies, seen in table 3.2, our event window will start one day 
before announcement day and continue to one day after the announcement day. Assuming that 
the announcement day is day 0, our event window will consist of three days  
[-1,1]. However, there is both a risk and a possibility that the stock market may anticipate the 
upcoming announcement due to inside information or rumours, in which case the share price 
will be affected before the announcement day. On the contrary, the market may also react 
slowly to an M&A announcement, which motivates a longer event window. By keeping the 
window relatively short there is a smaller chance that noise, other company events that affect 
the share price, will influence the result (Tuch, & O'Sullivan, 2007). Furthermore, Andrade et 
al. (2001) argue that studies using short-term event windows generate the most reliable 
results. An event window should, however, be long enough that possible overreactions by the 
market have time to be corrected.  
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Authors Year Acquirer  Target Observation Period Analytical Estimation  Event Windows 
Nation Nation from to Model Period 
Brown & Warner 1985 Random Random 1962 1979 MM,MARM 250 [-5,+5] 
Huang & Walking 1987 N/A N/A 1977 1982 MM 250 [-1,+1] [-50,+50] 
Jarrel et al. 1988 The U.S. All 1960 1985 MM N/A [-10,+5] 
Jarrell et al. 1989 The U.S. The U.S. 1981 1985 MM 170 [-20,+5] 
Mitchell & Lehn 1990 The U.S. The U.S. 1980 1988 MM 150 [-1,+1] [-5,+1] [-20,+40] 
Sudarsnam et al. 1996 The U.K. The U.K. 1980 1990 MM,MARM 250 [-40,+40] 
MacKinlay 1997 The U.S. The U.S. 1989 1993 MM 120 [-20,+20] 
Andrade et al. 2001 The U.S. The U.S. 1990 1998 N/A N/A [-1,+1] [-20,close] 
Chatterjee & Kuenzi 2001 The U.K. All 1991 1999 MM, MARM 200 [-1,0] [-5,+5] 
Beitel et al. 2004 European All 1985 2000 MM 252 [-1,+1] [-10,+10] [-20,+20] 
Boateng & Uddin 2009 The U.K. Foreign 1994 2003 MM 170 [-1,+1] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
 
Table 3.2 – Summary of previous and related studies. The analytical models, estimation 
period and event windows used in our study is based on these previous studies. 
As a result, we argue to use several short-term intervals in order to account for both problems 
prior the announcement, such as inside information and rumours, as well as problems post the 
announcement (overlapped event windows, overreactions or slow reactions by the market). 
We will use the following event windows; [-1,1], [-3,3], [-5,5], [-10,10], [-1,3] and [-1,10], 
which is a mix of previous studies, seen in table 3.2., [-1,1], [-5,5], [-10,10] are the most 
common used ones during short-term studies. E.g. Boateng and Uddin (2009) use all these 
windows in their study. Our other three windows are added to get a broader view and capture 
all the short-term effects, while at the same time get a better perspective to analyse our results. 
ii. Determine the normal return 
To increase the validity of our study we will calculate, as mentioned, the normal return in two 
ways, through the Market Model formula (3) and the Market Adjusted Return Model (4). The 
difference and advantages with each formula will be discussed in the end of this section after 
each model have been explained. 
The normal return of a share is defined as the expected return assuming that the acquisition 
never occurred, and thus was never announced. Consequently, it is a form of benchmark that 
is needed to further calculate the actual return. To approximate such a benchmark, a market 
index is often used. On the Swedish market, we have chosen to use Affärsvärdens General 
Index (AFGX), which is similar to the Swedish study made by Doukas, Holmen and Travlos 
in 2002. On the Norwegian market we have consequently chosen a corresponding index,  
Olso Stock Exchange General Index (OSLOASH). The actual return is further calculated for 
every stock included in our study, and is calculated with the Market Model formula which 
assumes a linear relationship between the market portfolio m and the return of the share i. 
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However, we also assumed in line with Kuenzi and Chatterjee (2001) that the average error 
term E(εi) = 0. 
                     (3) 
Where: 
Rit  = Actual return on share i on announcement day t 
αi  = Intercept term 
βi  = Slope coefficient associated with the return of the market portfolio (m) 
Rmt = (Normal) Return on the market portfolio (m) on announcement day (t) 
εi  = Error term 
The coefficients αi and βi are determined by ordinary least squares regression, and are 
calculated for each company in our sample based on a historical pre-event estimation period. 
According to Wubben (2007) most studies have used an estimation period of a full year or 
approximately 250 trading days. This can also be confirmed in table 3.2 where we 
summarized some of previous studies. We have therefore chosen an estimation period of 250 
days, starting from t-340 to t-90 days prior the announcement day. Such a period will not be 
too far from the event windows making the estimated parameters non relevant, and at the 
same time, it is not too close to the event itself which could lead to distortion (Kuenzi, & 
Chatterjee, 2001). 
The Market Adjusted Return Model instead assumes that αi = 0 and βmt = 1 (MacKinlay, 
1997). Hence, the Market Adjusted Return Model assumes that expected return on stock i is 
equal to the return of the market index. 
             (4) 
Where: 
E(Rit)  = Normal return on stock (i) at announcement day (t) 
Rmt  = Return on the market portfolio (m) on announcement day (t)’ 
While the Market Adjusted Return Model simplifies a β of one and α of zero, the Market 
Model calculates the true values. Consequently, the Market Model is more correctly.  
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iii. Determine the abnormal return 
The abnormal return, AR, of a share i for the announcement day t reflects the estimated 
impact of the announcement on the share price. The abnormal return is the difference between 
the actual and the normal return.  
                   (5) 
Where: 
ARit  = Abnornal return on stock i on announcement day t 
To determine if abnormal returns exist, we calculated the average abnormal return, AR, of 
each security in every period in the event window. Then, each individual security’s abnormal 
return is aggregated for all the event windows, which gives us the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) for each specific security.  
          
 
 
     
 
    (6) 
               
  
    
 (7) 
 
iv. Measure the statistical significance  
In the final step we test the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. In order to do this 
we first have to formulate the null hypothesis, H0, that the acquisition has no impact on the 
target company’s shareholder value. Then, we have formulated an alternative hypothesis, H1, 
that target shareholder return is not equal to zero.    
H0  = Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for target companies are equal to zero 
H1  = Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for target companies are not equal to zero  
The null hypothesis is then further tested with a t-test in line with Lyon et al., 1999. 
  
       
          
 
Before explaining the regressions we present a short summary of all the hypotheses and their 
respective dummy variable abbreviation. 
(8) 
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Hypothesis   Dummy variable 
2 Hostile takeovers generates higher returns than friendly takeovers HOSTILE 
3 Successful bids generates higher returns than unsuccessful bids   SUCCESSFUL 
4 Cash offers generates higher returns than stock or hybrid offers CASH 
5 Higher returns is expected during boom periods than during bust periods BOOM 
6 Unrelated deals generate higher returns than related deals RELATED 
7 Cross-border M&A generates higher returns than domestic M&A CROSS 
 
Table 3.3 – Summary of hypothesis and dummy variables, presented in order for the reader to 
better follow the regression below.  
When performing linear regression based on dummy variables, all variables take a value of 
either of either 0 or 1. The values in this study are previously classified in section 2.9 – 
Hypotheses. To perform a Classic Linear Regression the following formula will be used 
where α and β is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares method (Kennedy, 2003). 
                                                   
                         
However, when regression is made for hostile and friendly deals separately, the first dummy 
variable, βaHOSTILEa, is not incorporated in the formula. In our formula, CAR is the 
dependable variable and the dummy variables are the explanatory variables. Furthermore, six 
assumptions are made when conducting this type of regression.  (Brooks, 2002) 
The first assumption is an implicit assumption regarding the OLS method, which assumes that 
the explanatory variables are not correlated. However, in reality it is not likely that the 
variables are zero correlated since there almost always exists some multicollinearity. To test 
for the extent of this multicollinearity we have created a matrix of correlations between the 
specific variables. Three matrixes were created, one for Sweden, one for Norway and one for 
Scandinavia. The multicollinearity matrix for Scandinavia is presented in table 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
(9) 
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  Successfulness Country of Acquirer Payment Method Relatedness Friendly/Hostile Boom/ Bust 
Successfulness 1 
     
Country of Acquirer -0,0545 1 
    
Payment Method 0,0763 0,1031 1 
   
Relatedness 0,1243 -0,2528 0,3363 1 
  
Friendly/Hostile -0,4098 -0,0266 0,0586 0,0282 1 
 
Boom/Bust  -0,0503 -0,0133 0,0485 0,0329 0,1616 1 
 
Table 3.4 – Multicollinearity matrix for Scandinavia, describing the correlation between the 
different variables. 
Brooks (2002) use as a rule of thumb that any correlation below 0,8 is non-problematic. As 
can be seen in table 3.4, the correlations are relatively low and will thus not influence our 
results. Moreover, since the results were approved for the Norwegian and the Scandinavian 
market as well, we only choose to present the result for Sweden’s matrix. 
Assumption two to six concern the error term, ε. The second assumption is that the average 
error term is presumed to be zero. The third assumption states that the variance of the errors is 
constant and the fourth assumption continue to state that the different error terms are 
uncorrelated with one another. Furthermore, fifth assumption is that explanatory variables are 
non-stochastic, which indicates that they are independent and uncorrelated with the error 
term. Lastly, the sixth assumption states that the error term is normally distributed. (Brooks, 
2002) 
3.3. Data Collection 
When conducting a research and event study there are two major types of data one could use; 
primary and secondary. Primary data, such as questionnaires, interviews etc., is data collected 
by the researchers themselves. The main advantages with primary data is that since you 
collect the data yourself, you have more control over its accuracy, relevance and objectivity, 
whereas the disadvantages are that it could be very costly and time-consuming. Secondary 
data, such as books, journals etc., is data collected by someone else; hence all data throughout 
this thesis are secondary. (Ober, 2007)  Our data was collected from several databases, further 
discussed in section 4.4, and was compiled to the following criteria: 
 The transaction was announced between 2000-01-01 and 2010-12-31 
 The transaction was classified as a merger or acquisition, not a strategic investment 
 The target was a publicly listed Swedish or Norwegian based firm 
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 The deal status was either completed or cancelled/withdrawn within the previous 
mentioned time horizon 
 The bid fulfilled at least one of the two following criteria: 
1. The bid was a takeover bid where the acquiring company’s purpose was to acquire 
all of the target company’s outstanding stock 
2. The acquirer controlled less than 50 per cent of the target’s outstanding shares 
before the transaction, and more than 50 per cent after/if the transaction was 
completed. 
 Bids that were either raised or contested within our event windows were not included 
3.4. Reliability 
Reliability concerns the degree of replicability of this study. In order for our study to be 
repeated we will thoroughly describe used methods and collected data. 
We have chosen to study M&A announcements where the target is a Swedish or Norwegian 
public company. The Swedish or Norwegian target has to be listed in order for us to measure 
the changes in the traded stock. To get our initial sample of M&A deals we used the databases 
Thompson Reuters 3000Xtra, Zephyr and MergerMarket, which all are classified to be 
reliable databases. Zephyr database was e.g. used by Le Nadant and Perdreau (2006) to collect 
sample data in their study. Moreover, MergerMarket was used by KPMG when they did their 
M&A study, “Competing for growth 2001”. Finally, Thompson Reuters is “the world’s 
leading source of intelligent information for business and professionals” (Thompson Reuters, 
2011).  
Above mentioned databases were further used to classify a transaction as either friendly or 
hostile. The same databases were also used to classify firm relatedness, method of payment, 
deal completeness and the geographical location of the acquirer. If for some reason the 
information did not correspond or was not given in the databases we have gathered and/or 
compared the given information from both the company’s press releases as well as other 
articles provided by the database Affärsdata, Cisionwire, or Dagens Industri’s webpage. This 
resulted in that we classified 17 deal purposes and 6 method of payment ourselves according 
to the definitions made in 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Instead of making the classifications 
ourselves we could have excluded the specific deals from the study, but we believed this 
would have resulted in a too large loss of transactions, thus, not given us a large enough 
sample. Since we have collected the date through several databases and transferred manually 
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to excel-documents and moreover classified several deals ourselves, there is a chance of 
human errors during the process, which could lower the reliability.   
Moreover, stock prices and comparative indices were collected from Thompson Reuters 
Datastream Advanced, which also is classified as a reliable database since it “is the world’s 
largest financial statistical database” (Datastream, 2011). Furthermore, Danbolt (2004) uses 
this database in his study. 
3.5. Validity 
According to Bryman and Bell (2005) validity can be divided into conceptual, internal and 
external validity. 
Conceptual validity, also known as theoretical validity, concerns the issue of whether the 
study really measures the question at hand (Bryman, & Bell, 2005). Our main purpose in this 
study is to analyse if there are any significant differences in target shareholder return between 
friendly and hostile takeovers. The first question that consequently must be raised is how we 
can measure the affect on target shareholder return? In order to increase the validity of our 
result we have chosen to calculate target shareholder return by using two different models; the 
Market Model and the Market Adjusted Return Model. Both of these models measure the 
change in share prices resulting from the M&A announcement (actual return – normal return). 
The difference between these models is how you calculate the normal return. The second 
question must therefore be to question our model regarding how to measure the normal return, 
which is the expected change in the stock price if the transaction never would have happened. 
The two methods we have chosen in this study have been used in similar studies, i.e. Brown 
and Warner (1985), Conn et al. (2005) and MacKinlay (1997), which give validity to our 
study. Furthermore, these methods have been used repeatedly in the last 25 years, which 
indicates that there are no better methods available and uphold even more validity to our 
study. An alternative method could have been to use the Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return 
model used by Lyon et al. (1999). However, this model is more suitable when testing for 
long-run abnormal return and since the model can give a slight misleading result in short term 
prospects, we have chosen to rely on previous mentioned models. 
Internal validity concerns the issue of whether it can be concluded that one variable, x, affect 
another variable, y, or if it is possible that some other variable give rise to a seemingly causal 
relationship (Bryman, & Bell, 2005)? As mentioned before, this study presumes a semi-strong 
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efficiency (Fama, 1970), which assumes that any changes in stock prices are attributable to 
new information i.e. an M&A announcement. However, there is a possibility that stock price 
fluctuations depend on more than the announcement information, which will distort our result. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, the method used in this study has been used in similar 
studies increasing the validity. Moreover, to uphold even more validity and minimize the risk 
of a distorted result we have used relatively short event windows, which will decrease the 
possibility of other company events affecting our result.  
External validity concerns the issue of whether the result from this study can be generalized 
and used in other settings (Bryman, & Bell, 2005). In order for this quantitative study to 
uphold external validity it is very important that the sample is representative for the 
Scandinavian market. The sample and the selective criteria were previously discussed in 
section 3.3. In the last chapter of this thesis we will discuss and suggest further research built 
upon our result. Consequently, we will first be able to know the external validity of our result 
in the future. However, in order for this study to be easily repeated we will now go through 
the event study. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we will first present our sample, then present and analyse our empirical 
results. This result will follow in the same order as our hypothesis. First we will present the 
result shortly, whereafter a more analytical text will follow consistently focused on the 
difference between hostile and friendly takeovers.  
4.1. Sample Description 
This sample description section can further be divided in two sections. First, we will introduce 
our initial sample and argue why several takeovers have been removed. Second, we will 
describe the used sample by tables and figures in order for the reader to get a better 
understanding of the sample. This can be found in appendix 1-4. Appendix 1-2 consist of all 
the hostile takeovers, while, appendix 3-4 consists of all friendly takeovers.  
4.1.1. Original Sample 
Our initial data sample included 171 public takeover bids in Sweden whereof 34 were 
classified as hostile and 137 as friendly. In Norway our initial data sample included 96 public 
takeovers bids whereof 14 were classified as hostile and 82 as friendly. Due to causes, 
explained after table 4.1, we have chosen to not include the following four deals in our sample 
when we made our regressions.  
Announcement Target Acquirer Country of Target Friendly/Hostile 
2001-05-25 Jobline International AB Monster.com Sweden Friendly 
2008-10-15 Peab Industi AB Peab AB Sweden Hostile 
2008-10-27 Revus Energy ASA WNEP* Norway Friendly 
2008-12-09 Wayfinder Systems AB Vodafone Group Sweden Friendly 
* Wintershall Norwegen Explorations und Produktions GmbH 
Table 4.1 – Excluded deals in our regression sample.  
To get as homogenous and representative sample as possible, we plotted our data to see if it 
included any extreme values. As can be noticed in figure 4.1 we had three extreme values in 
Sweden. The first two, marked in red, had significantly higher values than the median and 
mean value in the sample. The two deals had further extremely high values for all our event 
windows, but we only choose to display an example of one window. To make sure that these 
extreme values would not affect our parameters in regression, we decided, in consensus with 
our tutor, to remove them from our sample. The third red plot is the hostile acquisition of 
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Peab Industry by Peab. Peab was founded 1959 by the Paulsson family. Peab Industri, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Peab, was in 2006 listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange. This 
procedure was possible due to the fact that the shareholders of Peab received the entire 
amount of shares in Peab Industri. In 2008 Peab realised that the two companies could earn 
extensive synergies together, and made for that reason an offer of the entire firm. Why the 
offer was classified as a hostile takeover according to MergerMarket and Thomson Reuters 
3000Xtra seems odd. The Paulsson family was the largest owner of Peab, with 71 per cent of 
the votes in Peab Industri and had influential positions on the boards of both firms. (Peab, 
2008) Since this deal generated a very low return for the shareholders of Peab Industri during 
the event windows, which might have something to do with the extraordinary ownership 
structure, and since we believe it is wrongfully classified, we have chosen, also in consensus 
with our tutor, not to include the deal in our study. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Plot of Swedish Sample. The three red marked plots are excluded in our sample.  
Further, when we plotted the Norwegian sample in figure 4.2 we found one extreme value, 
which had significantly higher values for all the event windows, than the median and mean 
value in the Norwegian sample. Consequently, we decided, in consensus with our tutor, to 
remove the deal from our sample.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Plot of Norwegian Sample. The red marked plot is excluded in our sample.  
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4.1.2. Description of Used Sample 
The data below is presented with a distinct focus on the difference between friendly and 
hostile bid characteristics in the two countries.  
Our sample consists of 224 completed and 37 cancelled deals. Note the relationship of 
cancelled deals and hostile takeovers in figure 4.3, where 36 per cent of the Swedish and 64 
per cent of the Norwegian hostile takeovers are cancelled. The same relationship, cancelled to 
total deals, for friendly takeovers is four per cent for Swedish and 12 per cent for Norwegian 
deals. Friendly cancelled deals in Scandinavia are seven per cent of all friendly, while the 
hostile cancelled are 45 per cent.  
 
Figure 4.3 – Deal completeness viewed as friendly and hostile in Sweden, Norway and 
Scandinavia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Friendly Hostile Friendly Hostile Friendly Hostile
Sweden Norway Scandinavia
Cancelled 6 12 10 9 16 21
Complete 127 21 71 5 198 26
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As can be viewed in table 4.2, Sweden and Norway have the largest amount of transactions. 
This is due to the fact that domestic acquisitions are more common than cross-border 
acquisitions. In both Sweden and Norway, domestic friendly takeover attempts represent 
above 60 per cent. For hostile takeovers we found that 73 per cent of the deals in Sweden and 
57 per cent of the deals in Norway are domestic. However, even though we would rank only 
cross-border acquisitions, we would find both Sweden and Norway in the top since there is 
high M&A activity between the two countries. The largest outsider is United States, followed 
by Finland, United Kingdom, Denmark and France. We believe that this relationship was 
expected since top ranked countries are either situated in the Nordics or have a large export 
and/or import exchange with Sweden and Norway.  
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Total 
  Friendly Hostile   Friendly Hostile 
 
Friendly Hostile       
Sweden 82 23 
 
6 1   88 24 
 
  112 
Norway 9 2 
 
51 8 
 
60 10 
 
  70 
United States 12 1 
 
4 1 
 
16 2 
 
  18 
Finland 6 0 
 
3 0 
 
9 0 
 
  9 
United Kingdom 5 2 
 
1 1 
 
6 3 
 
  9 
Denmark 4 0 
 
2 1 
 
6 1 
 
  7 
France 2 1 
 
4 0 
 
6 1 
 
  7 
Germany 3 1 
 
2 0 
 
5 1 
 
  6 
Netherlands 1 0 
 
3 1 
 
4 1 
 
  5 
Iceland 0 1 
 
3 0 
 
3 1 
 
  4 
Bermuda 0 0 
 
2 1 
 
2 1 
 
  3 
Canada 3 0 
 
0 0 
 
3 0 
 
  3 
Switzerland 3 0 
 
0 0 
 
3 0 
 
  3 
Belgium 1 0 
 
0 0 
 
1 0 
 
  1 
Japan 1 0 
 
0 0 
 
1 0 
 
  1 
Luxembourg 0 1 
 
0 0 
 
0 1 
 
  1 
Russia 1 0 
 
0 0 
 
1 0 
 
  1 
United Arab Emirates 0 1 
 
0 0 
 
0 1     1 
Total 133 33   81 14   214 47 
 
  261 
 
Table 4.2 – Cross-border acquisitions, entire sample divided into origin of target and 
acquiring company. Origin of acquiring firm (on the right side) is categorized by total 
amount of deals.  
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Structure of payment divided into the two types of deal attitudes, hostile and friendly, is 
presented in 4.4. Other structures, equity swap or a combination of equity and cash, are more 
common during friendly takeovers than hostile. The percentage of friendly deals that is pure 
cash offers is 72 per cent compared with 79 per cent for hostile deals in Scandinavia. This 
pattern is similar for both Sweden and Norway. Cash offers are represented in 66 per cent of 
the friendly deals and 74 per cent of hostile in Sweden, while the cash offer relationship in the 
Norwegian sample is represented in 82 per cent of friendly deals and 93 per cent of hostiles. 
By this, we can conclude that cash offers is more common in hostile bids than friendly ones. 
 
Figure 4.4 – Method of payment in relationship to country and deal attitude.  
Figure 4.5 display that cash offers are slightly more common in bust periods compared with 
boom periods in both Sweden and Norway. However, the deviation between cash proportion 
during boom and bust in Norway is only two per cent and in the similar deviation is Sweden 
is nine per cent.  
 
Figure 4.5 – Method of payment in relationship to country and market condition. Y-axis 
represents cash used in percentage. Amount in bars represent cash deal in absolute terms.  
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Figure 4.6 display that friendly takeover bids are more common during boom periods than 
during bust periods. 39 per cent of the friendly deals are observed during a bust period and  
61 per cent during the boom period. The relationship is reversed for hostile takeover bids and 
60 per cent of the deals is observed for bust periods. This can be observed for both Sweden 
and Norway, even though the percentage might vary slightly. 
 
Figure 4.6 – Relationship among deal attitude and market status.  
There are no distinct patterns of relatedness and deal attitude, which can be calculated given 
the numbers in figure 4.7.  However, financial megers are slightly more common in hostile 
takeover attempts than in friendly ones. Financial mergers are represented by 19 per cent of 
the friendly takeover sample in Sweden compared to 36 per cent of the hostile sample. Similar 
pattern can be found in Norway, where 29 per cent of the friendly takeovers are financial 
mergers and 36 per cent are hostile. The most common merger type for Scandinavia is 
horizontal, which is represented in 148 deals or 57 per cent of the 261 takeover attempts.    
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Figure 4.7 – Firm relatedness. Related deals is horizontal and vertical, and unrelated deals is 
conglomerate and financial.  
4.2. Result and analyses of hypotheses 
4.2.1. Hypothesis One – Target Shareholder Return 
Our first hypothesis is whether or not return to target companies is equal to zero. Previous 
research i.e. Dodd et al. (1977), Georgen and Renneboog (2003), Huang and Walkling (1987), 
Frank and Harris (1989) and Servaes (1983) all found that M&A increase the return for 
target’s shareholders. As can be seen in table 4.3, the same result has been found in our 
sample, both for the Norwegian, Swedish and Scandinavian market – thus confirming our 
hypothesis. Frank and Harris (1989) as well as Dodd and Ruback showed target returns of 20 
and 23 per cent respectively, during the bid month. Servaes (1991) also showed target return 
of 23 per cent but for the period from the announcement day until completion date, and Huang 
and Walkling (1987) showed target return of 23 per cent during the event window [t-1, t+1]. 
Even though our results are lower than 23 per cent, it is higher than Georgen and 
Renneboog’s (2003) result that reported target return of 13 per cent for the European market.  
 
 
Friendly Hostile Friendly Hostile Friendly Hostile
Sweden Norway Scandinavian
Conglomerate 17 2 3 0 20 2
Financial 26 12 24 5 50 17
Vertical 12 3 8 1 20 4
Horizontal 78 16 46 8 124 24
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Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
[t-10,t+10] 0,2209*** 11,6486 
 
0,1617*** 7,4029 
 
0,1994*** 13,7708 
[t-5,t+5] 0,2111*** 12,0655 
 
0,1735*** 8,7114 
 
0,1972*** 14,8615 
[t-3,t+3] 0,2042*** 12,2948 
 
0,1714*** 8,5458 
 
0,1920*** 14,9842 
[t-1,t+1] 0,1949*** 12,7370 
 
0,1611*** 8,5722 
 
0,1828*** 15,3801 
[t-1,t+3] 0,1978*** 12,2085 
 
0,1619*** 8,3842 
 
0,1847*** 14,8138 
[t-1,t+10] 0,1927*** 11,0640  0,1527*** 6,9552  0,1782*** 13,0565 
         Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
[t-10,t+10] 0,2218*** 12,1204 
 
0,1659*** 7,8510 
 
0,1996*** 15,8243 
[t-5,t+5] 0,2100*** 12,1964 
 
0,1715*** 8,8453 
 
0,1976*** 16,1038 
[t-3,t+3] 0,1998*** 12,1203 
 
0,1738*** 8,6891 
 
0,1924*** 15,6664 
[t-1,t+1] 0,1936*** 12,6060 
 
0,1619*** 8,4593 
 
0,1827*** 16,1405 
[t-1,t+3] 0,1957*** 12,2556 
 
0,1628*** 8,3847 
 
0,1849*** 15,8199 
[t-1,t+10] 0,1931*** 11,1914  0,1544*** 7,1308  0,1783*** 14,2865 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
     
Table 4.3 – Average CAR for Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway with very high statistical 
significance that target shareholder return is not equal to zero.  
Further, figure 4.8 depicts the aggregated average CAR to target shareholders during our 
event windows. The figure displays that for the Scandinavian market, target CAR are 
relatively flat up to day t-6 and thereafter register a constant slight increase up to the day 
before the announcement. At the announcement day, CAR increases the most, reacting 
favourably to the announcement and generating positive returns to investors. Further, the day 
after announcement, t+1, has also on average a sizable abnormal return. However, the period 
between t+1 and t+10 have on average a slight negative abnormal return for all the markets. 
This means, that for an investor who misses the investment opportunity during the 
announcement day, they can still benefit during t+1. However, after t+1 they, on average, 
experience a slight decrease until t+10. Consequently, it would be interesting to investigate 
target shareholder return from day t+1 until completion or cancellation day of the deal to see 
if a common investor can benefit from such transaction. 
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Figure 4.8 – Cumulative Abnormal Return for Sweden, Norway and Scandinavia.   
Moreover, the run-up period before the announcement date indicates either that the market 
may anticipate the bid or, as Holl, Salami and Sudarsnam (1996) and Chatterjee and Kuenzi 
(2001) argue, that corporate insiders are trading the stock. The figure further shows that such 
insider trading or market anticipations start earlier in Sweden than in Norway. Even though 
there is a run-up period before the announcement date, we may state that the market in general 
is semi-strong. This is in line with Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), due to the fact 
that the market reactions first on the announcement day. 
4.2.2. Hypothesis Two - Hostile Takeovers  
Our second hypothesis is to investigate if hostile takeovers generate higher returns to target 
shareholders than friendly takeovers. Our results from the two models in table 4.4 do not 
differ considerably, which gives reliability to our calculations. Further, table 4.4 show that 
average CAR is consistently higher for hostile takeovers than for friendly takeovers on the 
Scandinavian market, which is in line with our hypothesis. The percental difference between 
friendly and hostile bids fluctuates between 4,5 and 8,5 per cent in favour of the hostile bids. 
These results are independent of what event window we studied or model used to calculate the 
CAR. Except during the event window [t-10, t+10] on the Norwegian market, CAR is higher 
for hostile takeovers than for friendly takeovers in both countries. Moreover, if comparing the 
two countries, it is noticeable that Sweden in general has higher return than Norway, both for 
friendly and hostile bids.  
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Friendly Hostile   Friendly Hostile   Friendly Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] 19,64% 27,86%   15,09% 16,41%   17,92% 24,45% 
[t-5,t+5] 18,56% 26,45% 
 
15,80% 21,09% 
 
17,51% 24,85% 
[t-3,t+3] 17,07% 25,53% 
 
15,54% 23,03% 
 
16,49% 24,79% 
[t-1,t+1] 17,21% 22,75% 
 
14,46% 17,96% 
 
16,17% 21,32% 
[t-1,t+3] 16,91% 24,75% 
 
14,87% 19,29% 
 
16,13% 23,12% 
[t-1,t+10] 16,69% 24,99%   12,99% 22,01%   15,29% 24,11% 
         Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Friendly Hostile   Friendly Hostile   Friendly Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] 19,28% 29,21%   15,66% 15,42%   17,91% 25,10% 
[t-5,t+5] 18,65% 26,91% 
 
16,22% 19,86% 
 
17,73% 24,81% 
[t-3,t+3] 17,55% 26,08% 
 
15,64% 20,38% 
 
16,83% 24,38% 
[t-1,t+1] 17,28% 22,94% 
 
15,12% 16,39% 
 
16,46% 20,99% 
[t-1,t+3] 17,06% 25,18% 
 
14,92% 18,18% 
 
16,25% 23,10% 
[t-1,t+10] 16,45% 25,67%   13,32% 19,39%   15,27% 23,80% 
         
No. deals 132 33   81 14   213 47 
 
Table 4.4 – Average CAR for hostile deals specified for each country and event window, 
calculated with both Market Model and Market Adjusted Return Model. 
A higher CAR for hostile takeovers on the Scandinavian market is statistically significant for 
all the event windows, regardless of which method used to calculate the return, see table 4.5. 
Consequently, our hypothesis is confirmed, that hostile takeovers generate higher CAR than 
friendly takeovers on the Scandinavian market. However, the explanatory power, R
2
, varies 
around one to three per cent for all the event windows, which is relatively low. Further, the 
level of significance varies among the different event windows but is rather constant between 
the models. Event window [t-1, t+1] always show the lowest beta value which indicates that 
hostile takeovers, during these three days, over perform friendly takeovers less than during 
our other event windows. This can be explained due to the fact that this event window only 
includes one day after the announcement, meanwhile e.g. event window [t-1, t+10], which 
generates the highest beta value, includes ten days after the announcement. It can thus be 
determined that the more days that are included after the announcement, the higher return 
hostile takeovers generate compared to friendly takeovers. This will further be discussed and 
explained shortly after presenting table 4.5, where we display the friendly versus hostile 
regression on the Scandinavian market.
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
Event Window [t-10, t+10] 
 
Event Window [t-5, t+5] 
 
Event Window [t-3, t+3] 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
α 0,1792*** 13,5062 
 
α 0,1752*** 14,5495 
 
α 0,1649*** 13,9694 
β 0,0653** 2,0882 
 
β 0,0734** 2,5869 
 
β 0,0830*** 2,9827 
R
2
  0,0166 
  
R
2
  0,0252 
  
R
2
  0,0332 
 
           Event Window [t-1, t+1] 
 
Event Window [t-1, t+3] 
 
Event Window [t-1, t+10] 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
α 0,1617*** 14,5471 
 
α 0,1613*** 13,8652 
 
α 0,1529*** 11,6425 
β 0,0515* 1,9679 
 
β 0,0699** 2,5492 
 
β 0,0882*** 2,8497 
R
2
  0,0147 
  
R
2
  0,0245 
  
R
2
  0,0304 
  
 
Table 4.5 – Regression result for the Scandinavian market, where α represent return in 
friendly takeovers and β represents the additional return for hostile takeovers. 
Our results are in line with what previous studies have shown. For example, Franks and 
Mayer (1996) showed for the U.K market that hostile bids generated CAR of 30 per cent, 
meanwhile, friendly bids only generated 21,5 per cent. Moreover, Franks and Harris (1989) 
showed on the U.S. market CAR of 42 per cent for hostile bids and 28 per cent for friendly 
bids. However, our results are lower, which can be explained with the fact that we have used a 
shorter time period in our event windows. Franks and Mayer (1996) do not specify their event 
window, but Franks and Harris used an event window that ended one month after the 
announcement date. The fact that their event window is longer post the announcement implies 
that their measure take into account-revised bids, which our event windows do not. Holl and 
Kyriazis (1997) argue that when target management reject bids, the target share price 
increases since the negotiations that might follow may lead to a higher bid premium. Hence, a 
longer event window will capture more of the positive effects from increased bids, which may 
increase CAR to target shareholders and hence can explain Frank and Harris’ higher percental 
results. Another explanation for the different market results can be that each market has its 
Market Model 
Event Window [t-10, t+10] 
 
Event Window [t-5, t+5] 
 
Event Window [t-3, t+3] 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
α 0,1791*** 13,7026 
 
α 0,1773*** 14,8041 
 
α 0,1683*** 14,3248 
β 0,0719** 2,3340 
 
β 0,0708** 2,5084 
 
β 0,0756*** 2,7292 
R
2
  0,0206 
  
R
2
  0,0237 
  
R
2
  0,0280 
 
           Event Window [t-1, t+1] 
 
Event Window [t-1, t+3] 
 
Event Window [t-1, t+10] 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
α 0,1646*** 14,9213 
 
α 0,1625*** 13,8870 
 
α 0,1527*** 11,7396 
β 0,0453* 1,7407 
 
β 0,0684* 2,4818 
 
β 0,0853*** 2,7845 
R
2
  0,0116 
  
R
2
  0,0232 
  
R
2
  0,0291 
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own regulation settings for takeovers to work within. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) state 
that U.S firms, compared to transatlantic firms have more alternatives to choose from when 
fighting a hostile takeover bid. These defence options might result in an even more increased 
takeover bid, which can explain the higher result in US compared to UK and Scandinavia. 
4.2.3. Hypothesis Three – Deal Successfulness 
Our third hypothesis states that successful deals generate higher returns than friendly deals. It 
is noticeable that the results do not differ as much between our two models in table 4.6, which 
gives reliability to our results. Regarding deal successfulness, it can be viewed in figure 4.1 
that hostile bids are more likely to be successful than unsuccessful on the Scandinavian 
market. This is rather unlike earlier studies which have reported that hostile bids have a higher 
probability of being unsuccessful (Franks, & Mayer, 1996; Dodd, & Ruback, 1977). More 
unsuccessful deals are also in line with management entrenchment theory, which states that 
target management are more resistant towards hostile deals due to their own personal 
incentives to stay within the firm. This is also supported by Manne (1965), who argue that 
hostile takeovers are the most powerful market mechanism for displacing bad managers. Our 
result is, however, inconsistent between the countries within Scandinavia.  As mentioned, 
hostile bids are more likely to be completed in Sweden, meanwhile, they are more likely to be 
cancelled in Norway. Another explanation for the high percentage of completed hostile bids 
can be attributed to chosen payment method. As will later be concluded in hypothesis 4, cash 
as payment method generate higher CAR. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that deals 
have higher chances of being accepted if cash is as payment method. Furthermore, 37 of 47 
hostile bids in Scandinavia have cash as payment structure, which could, to some extent, 
explain the high percentage successful deals in our sample. 
There is, however, a strong pattern in both models and all the event windows; that successful 
bids generate higher CAR than unsuccessful bids. This pattern supports our hypothesis, and is 
especially noticeable during [t-10, t+10] and [t-1, t+10] where the difference between 
successful and unsuccessful bids are approximately eight to nine per cent on the Scandinavian 
market.  
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Completed Cancelled   Completed Cancelled   Completed Cancelled 
[t-10, t+10] 31,24% 21,94%   17,74% 15,67%   28,65% 19,25% 
[t-5,t+5] 29,83% 20,53% 
 
20,47% 21,43% 
 
28,03% 20,92% 
[t-3,t+3] 27,13% 22,75% 
 
21,82% 23,71% 
 
26,11% 23,16% 
[t-1,t+1] 23,39% 21,62% 
 
19,64% 17,04% 
 
22,67% 19,66% 
[t-1,t+3] 26,64% 21,44% 
 
22,57% 17,46% 
 
25,86% 19,74% 
[t-1,t+10] 28,32% 19,17%   24,26% 20,76%   27,54% 19,85% 
         Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Successful Unsuccessful   Successful Unsuccessful   Successful  Unsuccessful 
[t-10, t+10] 31,86% 24,56%   16,95% 14,57%   29,00% 20,28% 
[t-5,t+5] 29,86% 21,76% 
 
20,79% 19,34% 
 
28,11% 20,72% 
[t-3,t+3] 27,71% 23,24% 
 
20,40% 20,36% 
 
26,30% 22,01% 
[t-1,t+1] 23,94% 21,18% 
 
18,82% 15,04% 
 
22,96% 18,54% 
[t-1,t+3] 27,31% 21,46% 
 
20,34% 16,99% 
 
25,97% 19,54% 
[t-1,t+10] 28,33% 21,01%   20,54% 18,76%   26,83% 20,05% 
         
No. deals 21 12   5 9   26 21 
 
Table 4.6 – Average CAR for completed and cancelled hostile bids on the Scandinavian 
market. 
The result for hostile deals is not statistically significant as can be viewed in table 4.7. 
Consequently, it cannot be determined that deal successfulness are an explanatory factor to 
why hostile bids generate higher returns than friendly bids. This could have some of its 
explanation due to the size of our sample. The sample for the Scandinavian market only 
includes 26 successful and 21 unsuccessful deals, which may be a too small sample and may 
thus be the reason for our inconclusive regression results. 
The results are however, in contrary to our hypothesis, statistically significant for friendly 
bids as well for the entire Scandinavian market. Level of significance differs however, 
depending on observed event window. Nevertheless, a common factor between friendly bids 
and the total Scandinavian market is that both models show significance at the 0.05 level 
during the event windows [t-10, t+10], and [t-1, t+10]. It is also these two event windows that 
generate the highest CAR, as mentioned before. The significance can be attributable to the 
fact that these two event windows have the longest post announcement period and the longer 
such period, the higher ability to predict the outcome of the bid. Also, according to the 
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shareholder interest theory, presented in 2.5.2, it would be reasonable to believe that a higher 
return in successful deals is correlated to management resistance. This can be explained since 
management resistant towards a bid may trigger higher premiums. Moreover, if the bid is 
contested, it may further lead to misvaluation by bidders and thus winners curse. 
Consequently, a longer post announcement period gives the target more time to exploit 
different defence mechanisms. Even though our study does not incorporate any revised bids in 
our event windows, management resistance may have occurred within, thus signalling in line 
with shareholder interest theory future higher returns. Consequently, even though our event 
windows, [t-10, t+10] and [t-1, t+10], does not incorporate any revised bids they are affected 
by target defence mechanisms within, which may trigger higher target returns in our event 
windows and finally also affect the successfulness of the deal. 
Our result implies that while it is initially hard to predict if a bid will be completed or 
cancelled, the ability increases over time. Our results further implies that a successful 
outcome is the most preferred outcome, which is in line with Dodd (1980) and Georgen and 
Renneboog (2003) who states that a cancelled deal over time will affect a share price 
negatively. 
  
Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
MARM 
 
Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0999 
 
1,6688 
 
0,0994 ** 2,0957 
 
0,0808 ** 2,3412 
[t-5, t+5] 0,0911 
 
1,5480 
 
0,0485 
 
1,1258 
 
0,0409 
 
1,2857 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0393 
 
0,6964 
 
0,0611 
 
1,3888 
 
0,0236 
 
0,7421 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0185 
 
0,3755 
 
0,0660 
 
1,5769 
 
0,0333 
 
1,1182 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0572 
 
1,1059 
 
0,0801 * 1,8399 
 
0,0503 
 
1,6274 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0804 
 
1,4212   0,1236 ** 2,5327   0,0708 ** 2,0359 
MM                         
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0890 
 
1,5310   0,0922 * 1,9341   0,0851 ** 2,3627 
[t-5, t+5] 0,0901 
 
1,5437 
 
0,0540 
 
1,2478 
 
0,0601 
 
1,8001 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0552 
 
0,9970 
 
0,0668 
 
1,5290 
 
0,0538 
 
1,6163 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0381 
 
0,7975 
 
0,0673 
 
1,6131 
 
0,0529 * 1,7057 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0694 
 
1,2965 
 
0,0840 * 1,9349 
 
0,0727 ** 2,2136 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0737   1,3054   0,1184 ** 2,4515   0,0927 ** 2,5592 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
           
Table 4.7 – Regression result on the Scandinavian market depending on the successfulness 
variable, sorted by friendly and hostile bids. Retrieved from appendix 5 and 6.  
Previous studies such as Dodd and Ruback (1977) reported average CAR of 20,89 per cent for 
successful hostile bids and 18,96 per cent for unsuccessful bids. Moreover Franks and Mayer 
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(1996) reported average CAR of 29,76 per cent for successful hostile bids and 21,50 per cent 
for unsuccessful bids. As seen previously in table 4.6, our result is more similar to Franks and 
Mayer’s. However, both previous studies have used the event window [t, t+30], which gives 
the market a longer post announcement time period to correct for cancelled bids compared to 
our event windows. Consequently, and with regards to Dodd’s (1990) conclusion that 
cancelled deals over time will result in lower returns, our results will in a longer event 
window probably be more similar to Dodd and Ruback’s result. 
Concluded from table 4.8 is that unsuccessful hostile takeovers in general have higher CAR 
than successful friendly takeovers. The stock reaction usually depends on what the market 
anticipates of the takeover attempt. We have in figure 4.3 concluded that hostiles are less 
completed compared to friendly. Hence, the probability of a successful outcome is lower for 
hostile attempts compared to friendly ones. Further, as depict in table 4.8, CAR is most equal 
for successful friendly and unsuccessful hostile in event window [t-10, t+10], which may 
indicate that the market adjust for the probability over time. On the contrary, event window  
[t-1, t+10], which is one of the event windows that takes into consideration the time after the 
announcement date the most, has one of the most widen spreads in results. Why unsuccessful 
hostiles generates higher CAR than successful friendly could be that the market calculate the 
probability of a hostile incorrect or that the bid premium on average is sizable larger, which 
leads to higher market reaction even though the probability of become successful is lower.  
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Successful Friendly 
 
Unsuccessful Hostile 
  Sweden Norway Scandinavia   Sweden Norway Scandinavia 
[t-10, t+10] 20,34% 15,43% 18,58%   21,94% 15,67% 19,25% 
[t-5,t+5] 19,11% 15,58% 17,85% 
 
20,53% 21,43% 20,92% 
[t-3,t+3] 17,60% 15,73% 16,93% 
 
22,75% 23,71% 23,16% 
[t-1,t+1] 17,63% 14,81% 16,62% 
 
21,62% 17,04% 19,66% 
[t-1,t+3] 17,45% 15,39% 16,71% 
 
21,44% 17,46% 19,74% 
[t-1,t+10] 17,55% 13,77% 16,19%   19,17% 20,76% 19,85% 
        Market Model 
 
Successful Friendly 
 
Unsuccessful Hostile 
  Sweden Norway Scandinavia   Sweden Norway Scandinavia 
[t-10, t+10] 19,80% 16,29% 18,54%   24,56% 14,57% 20,28% 
[t-5,t+5] 19,09% 16,35% 18,11% 
 
21,76% 19,34% 20,72% 
[t-3,t+3] 17,96% 16,15% 17,31% 
 
23,24% 20,36% 22,01% 
[t-1,t+1] 17,66% 15,64% 16,93% 
 
21,18% 15,04% 18,54% 
[t-1,t+3] 17,55% 15,63% 16,86% 
 
21,46% 16,99% 19,54% 
[t-1,t+10] 17,19% 14,29% 16,15%   21,01% 18,76% 20,05% 
        
No. deals 127 71 198   12 9 21 
 
 
Table 4.8 – Successful friendly takeovers attempts relative to unsuccessful hostile ones.  
4.2.4. Hypothesis Four – Deal Relatedness 
Our fourth hypothesis states that unrelated deals generate higher returns than related deals. 
Conglomerate and financial deals are classified as unrelated, whilst horizontal and vertical 
deals are classified as related. 
As can be seen in table 4.9, related deals are more common than unrelated deals on the 
Scandinavian market. The differences between the two models are relatively small, which 
increases the reliability of our results. Regardless of which model used, the average CAR for 
the event windows [t-10, t+10], [t-1, t+1], [t-1, t+3] and [t-1, t+10] is higher for unrelated 
deals, meanwhile, the event windows [t-5, t+5] and [t-3, t+3] generate higher average CAR 
for related deals. However, the average return depending on firm relatedness is inconclusive 
for the Scandinavian market. This inconclusiveness is attributable to the two different 
countries; unrelated deals generate higher return for the Swedish market, meanwhile related 
deals generate higher returns on the Norwegian market.  
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Unrelated Related   Unrelated Related   Unrelated Related 
[t-10, t+10] 32,51% 25,20%   6,53% 21,90%   24,87% 24,21% 
[t-5,t+5] 27,41% 25,90% 
 
10,04% 27,22% 
 
22,30% 26,30% 
[t-3,t+3] 28,45% 23,87% 
 
11,70% 29,33% 
 
23,52% 25,51% 
[t-1,t+1] 28,87% 19,25% 
 
11,09% 21,79% 
 
23,64% 20,01% 
[t-1,t+3] 29,60% 21,98% 
 
13,52% 22,49% 
 
24,87% 22,14% 
[t-1,t+10] 28,32% 23,10%   14,91% 25,96%   24,37% 23,95% 
         Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Unrelated Related   Unrelated Related   Unrelated Related 
[t-10, t+10] 34,79% 26,02%   6,90% 20,16%   26,59% 24,26% 
[t-5,t+5] 28,63% 25,93% 
 
10,80% 24,89% 
 
23,38% 25,62% 
[t-3,t+3] 28,50% 24,70% 
 
10,93% 25,63% 
 
23,33% 24,98% 
[t-1,t+1] 28,07% 20,01% 
 
10,30% 19,77% 
 
22,84% 19,94% 
[t-1,t+3] 28,51% 23,28% 
 
11,57% 21,86% 
 
23,53% 22,85% 
[t-1,t+10] 29,02% 23,76%   11,69% 23,67%   23,92% 23,73% 
         
No. deals 12 21   5 9   17 30 
 
Table 4.9 – Average CAR for related and unrelated hostile deals on the Scandinavian market. 
However, the results for hostile bids are neither statistically significant for the Scandinavian 
market, nor are they significant for the Swedish or the Norwegian market (Appendix 13). 
Consequently, it cannot be determined that deal relatedness are an explanatory factor to why 
hostile bids generate higher returns than friendly bids. As can be seen in table 4.10, our result 
on the Scandinavian market indicate the opposite of our hypothesis; that related deals generate 
higher returns than unrelated deals, for both friendly and hostile bids.  As discussed previous 
in section 2.3.2, these results are in line with operational synergies rather than financial 
synergies. 
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Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
MARM 
 
Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0618   -0,7939   0,0086   0,2987 
 
-0,0228   -0,8663 
[t-5, t+5] -0,1061 
 
-1,3884 
 
0,0051 
 
0,1951 
 
-0,0226 
 
-0,9291 
[t-3, t+3] -0,0793 
 
-1,0822 
 
-0,0033 
 
-0,1246 
 
-0,0223 
 
-0,9181 
[t-1, t+1] -0,0010 
 
-0,0161 
 
0,0000 
 
-0,0002 
 
-0,0127 
 
-0,5591 
[t-1, t+3] -0,0359 
 
-0,5347 
 
-0,0149 
 
-0,5639 
 
-0,0249 
 
-1,0533 
[t-1, t+10] -0,0808   -1,1002   -0,0114   -0,3853   -0,0315   -1,1863 
MM                         
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0518   -0,6858   -0,0066   -0,2284   -0,0106   -0,3957 
[t-5, t+5] -0,0999 
 
-1,3171 
 
-0,0045 
 
-0,1693 
 
-0,0146 
 
-0,5871 
[t-3, t+3] -0,0917 
 
-1,2746 
 
-0,0058 
 
-0,2194 
 
-0,0152 
 
-0,6128 
[t-1, t+1] -0,0163 
 
-0,2623 
 
-0,0095 
 
-0,3756 
 
-0,0094 
 
-0,4078 
[t-1, t+3] -0,0622 
 
-0,8936 
 
-0,0136 
 
-0,5156 
 
-0,0177 
 
-0,7209 
[t-1, t+10] -0,0850   -1,1594   -0,0126   -0,4297   -0,0204   -0,7558 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
           
Table 4.10 – Regression result for the Scandinavian market depending on firm relatedness, 
sorted by friendly and hostile bids. Retrieved from appendix 5 and 6. 
Previous research seems to be rather inconsistent regarding the question of relatedness. 
Shelton (2000) argued that related deals generated higher returns than unrelated deals, but 
found no relationship. Moreover, Holl (1997) also argued in favour of related deals, but his 
result indicated the opposite on the U.K market. We, on the other hand, argue in line with that 
opposite, but our result tend to benefit Holl’s original hypotheses, that related deals generate 
higher return than unrelated deals. 
The inconsistent result of previous research is in itself interesting and can partially be 
explained by Morck. (1988). They show that the bidding firm’s argument for the takeover 
should determine if the acquisition should be friendly or hostile. They argue that there are two 
types of takeovers; disciplinary and synergistic. Disciplinary takeovers are, as discussed in 
section 2.3.2, designed to change and increase the efficiency of the target firm’s management. 
The actual integration between the two companies is therefore in this case rather unimportant. 
In synergistic takeovers however, the primary goal is to make the integration as efficient as 
possible to gain the highest possible synergy. Morck et al. (1988) then states that disciplinary 
takeovers often are hostile meanwhile synergistic takeovers often are friendly. If this were to 
be true, it could partially explain the insignificance in our result since disciplinary takeovers 
in general can be both related and unrelated and as a result, firm relatedness could not explain 
the difference between friendly and hostile bids. 
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4.2.5. Hypothesis Five – Payment Method 
Our fifth hypothesis states that deals with only cash as payment method generate higher return 
to target shareholders than equity deals or hybrid deals. The average return, depending on 
payment method, is inconclusive for the Scandinavian market. The overall picture using 
MARM is that cash bids generate higher return than non-cash bids; however, using MM, the 
results are mixed. The payment method that generates the highest return varies, which is 
interesting since our results, again, seems to be attributable to the two different countries. 
Meanwhile, cash deals generate higher return on the Swedish market; non-cash deals generate 
higher return on the Norwegian market. It could further be argued that cash deals generate 
higher returns in Sweden than in Norway, whilst non-cash deals generate higher returns in 
Norway than in Sweden. However, it may be misleading to compare non-cash deal for the 
Norwegian market since there only is one non-cash deal in our Norwegian sample.  
Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Cash Non-cash   Cash Non-cash   Cash Non-cash 
[t-10, t+10] 30,55% 20,69% 
 
15,57% 27,28% 
 
25,29% 21,35% 
[t-5,t+5] 26,14% 27,27% 
 
20,62% 27,20% 
 
24,20% 27,26% 
[t-3,t+3] 26,58% 22,76% 
 
22,56% 29,15% 
 
25,17% 23,40% 
[t-1,t+1] 25,27% 16,02% 
 
17,69% 21,59% 
 
22,61% 16,57% 
[t-1,t+3] 26,29% 20,65% 
 
19,01% 22,97% 
 
23,73% 20,88% 
[t-1,t+10] 26,62% 20,65%   21,87% 23,80%   24,95% 20,97% 
Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Cash Non-cash   Cash Non-cash   Cash Non-cash 
[t-10, t+10] 32,07% 21,57% 
 
15,00% 20,88% 
 
26,08% 21,50% 
[t-5,t+5] 26,81% 27,18% 
 
19,52% 24,23% 
 
24,25% 26,89% 
[t-3,t+3] 26,13% 25,94% 
 
20,13% 23,67% 
 
24,02% 25,71% 
[t-1,t+1] 24,77% 18,06% 
 
16,01% 21,25% 
 
21,69% 18,38% 
[t-1,t+3] 25,51% 24,30% 
 
17,93% 21,47% 
 
22,85% 24,02% 
[t-1,t+10] 26,76% 22,76%   19,18% 22,18%   24,10% 22,70% 
         
No. deals 24 9   13 1   37 10 
Table 4.11 - Average CAR for cash versus non-cash takeovers in hostile bids.  
If instead analysing the entire sample, both friendly and hostile bids on the Scandinavian 
market, seen in table 4.12, it is possible to conclude that cash offers have higher CAR than 
non-cash offers – which supports our hypothesis. 
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Cash 
 
Non-cash 
  MARM MM   MARM MM 
[t-10, t+10] 20,83% 21,14% 
 
14,37% 13,94% 
[t-5,t+5] 20,30% 20,44% 
 
14,83% 15,09% 
[t-3,t+3] 19,47% 19,47% 
 
13,94% 14,68% 
[t-1,t+1] 18,41% 18,60% 
 
13,51% 13,67% 
[t-1,t+3] 18,90% 18,85% 
 
13,29% 13,75% 
[t-1,t+10] 18,82% 18,78% 
 
11,58% 11,40% 
No deal.  191 191   70 70 
Table 4.12 – Average CAR for cash versus non-cash offers in the entire Scandinavian sample.  
As further can be seen in table 4.13, the general picture show that it is statistically significant, 
for the Scandinavian market, that cash as payment method generate higher return to target 
shareholders – thus our hypothesis is confirmed. This could be determined due to the fact that 
friendly takeovers in Scandinavia, as well as the whole Scandinavian market, have 
significance for almost all event windows. However, the results are not statistical significant 
for all the event windows with the MM model, nor are they significant for hostile bids in 
specific. Thus, payment method cannot be said to be an explanatory variable for the fact that 
hostile takeovers generate higher CAR than friendly takeovers. Instead, it could be concluded 
that payment method is an explanatory factor to why friendly bids, as well as the whole 
sample, generate positive abnormal return to target shareholders. One possible reason to why 
it is significant for the whole sample, as well as for friendly bids, is that our sample of 47 
hostile deals might be too small to perform a reliable regression.  
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Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
MARM 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0437   0,5649   0,0407   1,3643   0,0562 ** 1,9766 
[t-5, t+5] -0,0086 
 
-0,1138 
 
0,0505 * 1,8632 
 
0,0517 ** 1,9743 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0437 
 
0,5993 
 
0,0472 * 1,7081 
 
0,0571 ** 2,1815 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0541 
 
0,8488 
 
0,0314 
 
1,1928 
 
0,0470 * 1,9189 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0281 
 
0,4198 
 
0,0500 * 1,8264 
 
0,0576 ** 2,2654 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0523   0,7164   0,0611 ** 1,9910   0,0752 *** 2,6295 
MM                         
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0507   0,6752   0,0560 * 1,8695   0,0545 * 1,9627 
[t-5, t+5] -0,0050 
 
-0,0669 
 
0,0529 * 1,9431 
 
0,0424 
 
1,6450 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0103 
 
0,1444 
 
0,0462 * 1,6817 
 
0,0398 
 
1,5506 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0298 
 
0,4835 
 
0,0414 
 
1,5784 
 
0,0399 * 1,6640 
[t-1, t+3] -0,0029 
 
-0,0420 
 
0,0506 * 1,8550 
 
0,0420 * 1,6572 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0310   0,4253   0,0688 ** 2,2663   0,0628 ** 2,2448 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
          
Table 4.13 – Scandinavian result for payment method with both MARM and MM, for friendly 
and hostile takeovers. Retrieved from Appendix 5 and 6.  
As previous displayed in table 4.11, cash offers are more common than non-cash offers for 
hostile bids. Cash offers represent 79 per cent of all hostile takeovers compared to 72 per cent 
of all the friendly, which can be seen in table 4.4 and 4.5. Why cash offers are more used than 
other payment structures, such as equity swaps, can be explain by four different theories. The 
first theory is the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984). This theory states that a 
firm should use cash since it is the cheapest form of financing followed by debt and then 
equity. Secondly, choice of cash may also be explained by the trade-off theory of Myers 
(2001), which explains that management choose to finance investments depending on their 
own capital structure. If a firm is highly leveraged, management rather choose equity than 
debt, since it decreases its costs of financial distress. The trade-off involved is to decrease the 
financial distress costs through decreased tax-deductible interest expenses. Consequently, 
highly leveraged firms rather use equity than cash to pay for M&A. Thirdly, it has also been 
argued that it is easier to pay with cash, than with voting rights and ownership in your firm, 
which is in line with Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen 1986). The hypothesis 
implies that management with high free cash flow rather invest in negative net present value 
projects, than pay out dividends to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Jensen argues that this 
principal-agent problem is positive correlated to increased cash flow.  Jensen’s free cash flow 
thus implies that management with large cash flows may engage in empire buildings and 
58 
 
consequently overpay for target firms. The last theory to explain why cash is more used 
payment method is explained by the signalling hypothesis of Yook (2003). He argues that the 
choice of equity signals to the market that the bidders’ own stock is overvalued. Yook argue 
that the signalling hypothesis recognises a mismatch of information, asymmetric information, 
between the acquirer’s managers and shareholders. However, in contradiction to these four 
theories preferring cash as payment, it can also be argued that an equity offer gives target 
management more incentives to make the acquisition as successful as possible. Serveas 
(1991) tested to what extent payment method has on the acquirer’s return. He found in his 
research that cash offers increase bidder abnormal return by 11 per cent compared to other 
payment methods. Since we have not examined the abnormal return for the bidder, we cannot 
draw any conclusions if this holds for our sample. However, it is interesting that both the 
bidder and target can earn higher abnormal return from cash offers compared to other 
payment methods.  
Moreover, no study as we know of, has tested the payment method variable to try to explain 
why hostile takeovers over perform friendly takeovers. However, our results for the entire 
market is lower compared to Servaes (1991), who on the American market, statistically 
determined that cash triggered 27 per cent return meanwhile non-cash deals generated 20 per 
cent. The reason to why Servaes’ results are higher can be since American hostile deals 
generate higher return than Scandinavian due to different regulations, as discussed in 
hypothesis two.  Our results are however more in line with Georgen and Renneboog (2003) 
who, on the European market, proved that cash offers triggered target shareholder return of 20 
per cent versus 14 per cent and 12,5 per cent for equity bids and hybrid offers, respectively. 
4.2.6. Hypothesis Six – Boom or Bust Period 
Our sixth hypothesis is that deals made during bust periods generate higher returns to target 
shareholders than deals made during boom periods. As previous displayed in figure 4.6, it is 
more common that a hostile bid is conducted during a bust period than during a boom period 
on the Scandinavian market. 60 per cent of the hostile bids are conducted during a bust period 
compared to 39 per cent of the friendly bids. Table 4.14 display the average return to target 
shareholders for hostile bids on the Norwegian, Swedish and the Scandinavian market. Except 
for event window [t-3, t+3] in Norway for the MARM model, the table further shows that the 
average return is higher, for all the markets, during bust periods than during boom periods – 
which are in line with our hypothesis. 
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Boom Bust   Boom Bust   Boom Bust 
[t-10, t+10] 25,84% 29,66% 
 
12,05% 19,54% 
 
21,48% 26,46% 
[t-5,t+5] 20,84% 29,92% 
 
18,78% 23,11% 
 
20,19% 28,02% 
[t-3,t+3] 21,85% 28,77% 
 
24,01% 22,46% 
 
22,53% 26,32% 
[t-1,t+1] 19,98% 25,08% 
 
16,93% 17,36% 
 
19,01% 22,89% 
[t-1,t+3] 19,95% 28,83% 
 
16,54% 19,86% 
 
18,87% 26,01% 
[t-1,t+10] 20,47% 28,73%   14,89% 24,16%   18,71% 27,77% 
         Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Boom Bust   Boom Bust   Boom Bust 
[t-10, t+10] 28,51% 29,17% 
 
9,93% 19,68% 
 
22,64% 26,77% 
[t-5,t+5] 22,29% 30,10% 
 
15,53% 22,82% 
 
20,15% 27,97% 
[t-3,t+3] 21,94% 27,93% 
 
17,60% 22,30% 
 
20,57% 26,97% 
[t-1,t+1] 19,64% 24,55% 
 
15,09% 18,74% 
 
18,20% 22,88% 
[t-1,t+3] 19,57% 27,88% 
 
15,95% 21,35% 
 
18,43% 26,27% 
[t-1,t+10] 20,96% 27,93%   13,04% 27,35%   18,46% 27,42% 
         
No. deals 13 20   6 8   19 28 
Table 4.14 – Average CAR for hostile during boom and bust periods. 
The fact that M&A during bust periods generate higher return to target shareholders than 
during boom periods is statistically significant for friendly bids, as well as for the entire 
Scandinavian sample – thus proving our hypothesis. However, as can be seen in table 4.15, 
this variable are not attributable to hostile bids and can therefore not explain why hostile bids 
generate higher returns than friendly bids. Once again, the reason why it is significant for 
friendly bids and the entire sample, but not for hostile bids, can be that it is hard to reach a 
significant result with a sample of only 47 hostile deals. 
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Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
MARM 
 
Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
Boom/Bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0458   0,7715   0,0990 *** 3,8998   0,0893 *** 3,8079 
[t-5, t+5] 0,0891 
 
1,5281 
 
0,0784 *** 3,3963 
 
0,0797 *** 3,6871 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0427 
 
0,7644 
 
0,0585 ** 2,4827 
 
0,0563 *** 2,6067 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0304 
 
0,6218 
 
0,0637 *** 2,8442 
 
0,0587 *** 2,9046 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0651 
 
1,2686 
 
0,0639 *** 2,7407 
 
0,0655 *** 3,1212 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0908   1,6196   0,0702 *** 2,6870   0,0750 *** 3,1742 
MM                         
Boom/Bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0321   0,5576   0,0807 *** 3,1603   0,0730 *** 3,1502 
[t-5, t+5] 0,0836 
 
1,4457 
 
0,0726 *** 3,1328 
 
0,0736 *** 3,4234 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0681 
 
1,2411 
 
0,0553 ** 2,3643 
 
0,0564 *** 2,6335 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0395 
 
0,8351 
 
0,0626 *** 2,8017 
 
0,0591 *** 2,9604 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0770 
 
1,4512 
 
0,0596 ** 2,5624 
 
0,0623 *** 2,9502 
[t-1, t+10] 0,0900   1,6096   0,0624 ** 2,4148   0,0659 *** 2,8283 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
           
Table 4.15 – Scandinavian result for boom and bust period with both MARM and MM, for 
friendly and hostile takeovers. Retrieved from Appendix 5 and 6. 
As presented in section 2.3.5, market value to the replacement cost of assets should be lower 
during bust periods. The proportion of market value to the replacement cost of assets is what 
scholars define as Tobin’s q-ratio (Chung, & Pruitt, 1994). Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) 
discovered that targets with low Tobin’s q benefits more from takeovers than targets with 
high Tobin’s q. Servaes (1991) argue that the most value creating M&A, for both parties, 
occurs when the acquiring firm has a high q-ratio and the target company has a low q-ratio. 
The opposite scenario, where a target firm has high q-ratio and acquiring firm has low q-ratio, 
explains the worst scenario where the chances of value destruction are the highest. Moreover, 
during bust periods, the stock market may be undervalued, hence increased possibilities for 
higher premiums and higher target shareholder return. Even so, target board might be aware 
of their company’s undervaluation and thus resist the bid, which may lead to an increased bid 
premium. The Tobin’s q-ratio may thus be an explanation to why Scandinavian M&A 
generate higher returns to target shareholder during bust compared to boom periods. Even 
though it is not statistical significant, this further indicates why hostile bids outperform 
friendly bids, since 60 per cent of the hostile bids are conducted during a bust period 
compared to 39 per cent of the friendly bids. 
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Our result that M&A during bust periods generate higher return to target shareholders than 
during boom periods contradict Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis as well the hubris 
hypothesis of Roll (1986). It further contradicts the study made by Shelton (2000) which 
concluded that bidder gains fall during peaks, suggesting that bidders have greater tendencies 
to overpay for targets during merger peaks. Our result is more in line with Georgen and 
Renneboog (2003) who applied a kind of boom versus bust variable in their study. However, 
they found that M&A generated around 14 per cent during bust periods and 11 per cent during 
boom periods, for event window [t-2, t+2] on the European market. The fact that our results 
are higher may result from a larger frequency of hostile takeovers in our sample and the fact 
that 60 per cent of our hostile takeovers were made during bust periods.  
4.2.7. Hypothesis Seven – Country of Acquirer 
Our seventh and last hypothesis states that cross-border deals generate higher return to target 
shareholders than domestic deals. According to table 4.16, Scandinavian target shareholders 
receive higher returns for domestic hostile takeovers than for cross-border hostile takeovers. 
This is due to the fact that Swedish hostiles is more represented in the aggregated 
Scandinavian sample and since domestic hostiles generates higher return than cross-border in 
Sweden, the same pattern can be viewed for Scandinavia. In Norway on the other hand, the 
results are inverse. In average, Norwegian hostile acquisitions generate much higher return 
than domestic hostiles.  
Moreover, in appendix 14, we can note that Swedish hostile cross-border acquisitions 
significantly underperform domestic acquisitions for event window [t-3, t+3] and [t-1, t+1]. 
However, there are no significance for the Norwegian market and consequently not for the 
entire Scandinavian market. 
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Market Adjusted Return Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Domestic Cross   Domestic Cross   Domestic Cross 
[t-10, t+10] 29,83% 23,32% 
 
9,54% 25,57% 
 
24,60% 24,16% 
[t-5,t+5] 28,88% 20,85% 
 
14,20% 30,27% 
 
25,10% 24,38% 
[t-3,t+3] 29,06% 17,43% 
 
14,95% 33,81% 
 
25,42% 23,57% 
[t-1,t+1] 25,38% 16,69% 
 
11,63% 26,41% 
 
21,83% 20,34% 
[t-1,t+3] 28,19% 16,84% 
 
13,43% 27,10% 
 
24,38% 20,69% 
[t-1,t+10] 27,86% 18,39%   15,85% 30,22%   24,76% 22,83% 
         Market Model 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  Domestic Cross   Domestic Cross   Domestic Cross 
[t-10, t+10] 32,29% 22,13% 
 
8,69% 24,40% 
 
26,20% 22,98% 
[t-5,t+5] 30,10% 19,58% 
 
14,34% 27,21% 
 
26,03% 22,44% 
[t-3,t+3] 30,25% 16,48% 
 
14,46% 28,27% 
 
26,18% 20,90% 
[t-1,t+1] 25,77% 16,42% 
 
10,94% 23,65% 
 
21,95% 19,13% 
[t-1,t+3] 29,21% 15,92% 
 
11,95% 26,49% 
 
24,76% 19,88% 
[t-1,t+10] 29,30% 17,32%   13,73% 26,94%   25,28% 20,93% 
         
No. deals 23 10   8 6   31 16 
 
Table 4.16 – Average hostile CAR for Domestic and Cross-border acquisitions for Sweden, 
Norway and Scandinavia.  
The result we have found, compiled in table 4.16, moreover indicate that friendly cross-border 
acquisitions in Scandinavia generate significant higher returns than domestic acquisitions 
during all six event windows. Our argument presented in section 2.7, that cross-border 
acquisitions could generate higher CAR than domestic acquisitions due to cultural differences 
and diversification synergies consequently hold for friendly bids.  
Further, our result implies that for hostile acquisitions, domestic bids generate higher return 
than cross-border bids. This is statistically significant for two event windows on the Swedish 
market, however, not for the Scandinavian market. Thus, we can conclude that the country of 
the acquirer cannot be viewed an explanatory variable to why hostile bids outperform friendly 
bids on the Scandinavian market. It is instead an explanatory variable to why friendly cross 
border bids outperform friendly domestic bids. 
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Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
MARM 
 
Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat 
  [t-10, t+10] -0,0193   0,5649   0,1051 *** 3,9342   0,0345   1,3836 
  [t-5, t+5] -0,0346 
 
-0,5117 
 
0,0691 *** 2,8444 
 
0,0217 
 
0,9443 
Country of [t-3, t+3] -0,0467 
 
-0,7198 
 
0,0476 * 1,9186 
 
0,0092 
 
0,4014 
Acquirer [t-1, t+1] -0,0116 
 
-0,2042 
 
0,0553 ** 2,3480 
 
0,0076 
 
0,3522 
  [t-1, t+3] -0,0402 
 
-0,6752 
 
0,0447 * 1,8221 
 
0,0048 
 
0,2134 
  [t-1, t+10] -0,0384   -0,5892   0,0537 * 1,9538   0,0016   0,0628 
MM                         
  [t-10, t+10] -0,0458   -0,6847   0,0886 *** 3,2962   0,0687 *** 2,7748 
  [t-5, t+5] -0,0617 
 
-0,9178 
 
0,0591 ** 2,4236 
 
0,0432 * 1,8811 
Country of [t-3, t+3] -0,0804 
 
-1,2614 
 
0,0442 * 1,7951 
 
0,0266 
 
1,1612 
Acquirer [t-1, t+1] -0,0279 
 
-0,5072 
 
0,0458 * 1,9466 
 
0,0339 
 
1,5858 
  [t-1, t+3] -0,0600 
 
-0,9741 
 
0,0464 * 1,8983 
 
0,0305 
 
1,3483 
  [t-1, t+10] -0,0643   -0,9893   0,0528 * 1,9415   0,0353   1,4174 
* p < 0,10, ** p < 0,05, *** p < 0,01 
           
Table 4.17 - Regression result on the Scandinavian market depending on the country of 
acquirer, sorted by friendly and hostile bids. Retrieved from appendix 5 and 6. 
We argue that an explanation to why foreign acquisitions may be seen as an explanatory 
variable only for friendly bids, can be that hostile bids require a higher premium to start with 
and that the acquirer cannot motivate an even higher premium. While a friendly bid can 
increase its premium to motivate target management and make the transaction as smooth as 
possible, a hostile bid may not. Consequently, the premium in hostile acquisitions for cross-
border and domestic bids initially remain the same. However, since the cross-border premium 
also must consider possible barriers, such as political and cultural differences that have to be 
overcome (Conn et al., 2003), the premium paid to target may end up at a lower level 
compared to if the bid would have been domestic. Our results are in line with Danbolt (2004), 
who found on the U.K market that cross-border acquisitions generated higher return than 
domestic acquisitions, although he could not find statistically significance.  
As we know of, there has not been any previous study regarding the dilemma if higher 
premiums for hostile takeovers can be explained by whether the bid is foreign or domestic.  
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this last chapter we will first present the conclusions drawn from our results and analyses, 
and then we will finally present some suggestions for further research. 
5.1. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to analyse if there are any significant differences in 
target shareholder return between friendly and hostile takeovers bids on the Scandinavian 
market. We also intended to investigate the differences between hostile and friendly bid 
characteristics, and determine to what extent these differences could be explained by our 
chosen variables. Our sample consisted of Scandinavian transactions, covering the years 
between 2000 and 2010. Furthermore, since Swedish and Norwegian transactions represented 
94 per cent of all hostile takeovers in Scandinavia, we only included these two countries in 
our sample.    
First of all, our null hypotheses significantly proved that M&A create positive abnormal 
return to target shareholders around the announcement day. We have proven positive 
abnormal returns of around 18 per cent, for all of our six short-term event windows. Secondly, 
we have found that hostile takeovers generate significantly higher returns than friendly 
takeovers on the Scandinavian market. Hostile takeover generate average abnormal returns of 
21 to 25 per cent depending on which event window to analyse. During the same interval for 
friendly bids the return is 15 to 18 per cent. However, we have not been able to statistically 
proven why hostile takeovers outperform friendly takeovers, although we have found two 
indications of patterns. 
The first pattern to why hostile takeovers over perform friendly takeovers can be found in our 
payment method variable. We have shown indications that cash offers generate higher return 
than non-cash offers. At the same time, we have concluded that hostile deals are more often 
than friendly deals made with cash as payment method. Consequently, a reason that may 
indicate why hostile takeovers over perform friendly takeovers is that cash as payment 
method is more common in hostile takeovers, since cash in general over perform other types 
of payment methods. The second pattern is related to whether or not the bid was made during 
a boom or bust period. We have concluded that due to Tobin’s q-ratio and an under valuated 
stock market, there is a wider room for higher premiums during bust periods. We have also 
concluded that hostile deals are more often made during these bust periods than friendly deals. 
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Consequently, even though it is not statistically significant, the time horizon of the deal 
indicates to explain why hostile bids generate higher return than friendly bids. 
Our results also indicate, however not statistical significant, that successful deals generate 
higher returns than unsuccessful deals. Further, our results show that the return is higher the 
more days after the announcement day that is included in the event window. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the market’s ability to foresee whether or not a bid would be successful 
improves over time. However, our event windows are relatively short and consequently, the 
successfulness of a deal cannot explain why hostile bids generate higher return than friendly 
bids. We have also concluded that the reason to why hostile takeovers over perform friendly 
takeovers cannot be attributable to deal relatedness or the country of acquirer. Further, deal 
relatedness varies between the Scandinavian countries. In Norway, related deals generate 
higher return than unrelated deals meanwhile the situation is reverse in Sweden. This dilemma 
is also attributable to the country of acquirer; meanwhile cross-border acquisitions generate 
higher returns than domestic acquisitions in Norway, the situation is reverse in Sweden. This 
inconclusiveness consequently affects our results on the Scandinavian market and may 
explain why there are no significant results for these variables.  
We have throughout this thesis contributed to new results regarding hostile takeovers on the 
Scandinavian market. First, we have statistically determined that M&A on the Scandinavian 
market create positive abnormal returns to target shareholders.  We have moreover 
statistically proven that hostile deals generate higher returns than friendly deals. Both of our 
results are in line with previous research on the U.S, U.K as well as the entire European 
market. Our variables used to investigate the difference between hostile and friendly 
takeovers are initially variables used by scholars to explain positive target return. Thus, our 
variables are not new, but used in a different setting than before. However, regardless that we 
have not been able to statistically prove why hostile takeovers outperform friendly takeovers, 
we have contributed to new research for target shareholder return in hostile takeovers for the 
Scandinavian market. 
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5.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
During the process of our theses we have encountered an abundance of interesting areas for 
potential further research.  
Firstly, our sample of 47 hostile takeovers in Scandinavia is a rather small sample and 
therefore more affected by abnormal sizes of deal premiums in our sample. Consequently, we 
think it would have been interesting to repeat our study on the European market in order to get 
a bigger sample of hostile deals. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to investigate if hostile takeovers generate higher abnormal 
returns to target shareholder with regard to other variables, or more specific, those variables 
mentioned in section 1.4 – demarcations.  
Thirdly, we removed several extreme values in our sample due to different and previous 
explained reasons. It would therefore be interesting to conduct a study based solely on 
extreme values, to investigate how they differ from “ordinary” deals and to conclude why 
such an extreme premium is motivated.  
Forthly, it would be interesting to include a longer event window to see if M&A generate 
positive abnormal return to target shareholders over time. Moreover, it would also be 
interesting to include an event window stretching from day t+1 until the deal either is 
completed or cancelled. Since the “common investor” may not be able to invest during the 
announcement day, this event window would reveal whether or not it is still profitable to 
invest starting the day after the announcement.  
Finally, it would be interesting to conclude what role target defence mechanisms play in 
hostile takeovers. More specifically, to investigate if different defence tactics trigger different 
returns and at the same time to determine which one that is the most effective. 
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Appendix 1 – Swedish hostile takeover attempts, 2000-2010. 
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Appendix 3 – Swedish friendly takeover attempts, 2000-2010.  
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Appendix 4 – Norwegian friendly takeover attempts, 2000-2010.  
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Appendix 5 – Results, Market Adjusted Return Model – Scandinavia 
  
Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1565 ** 2,1148     -0,0225   -0,4481     0,0156   0,3803   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2021 *** 2,7805 
  
0,0360 
 
0,7883 
  
0,0651 * 1,7202 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2109 *** 3,0266 
  
0,0351 
 
0,7524 
  
0,0852 ** 2,2519 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1466 ** 2,4030 
  
0,0327 
 
0,7386 
  
0,0748 ** 2,1139 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1654 ** 2,5873 
  
0,0147 
 
0,3186 
  
0,0554 
 
1,5052 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1436 ** 2,0556     -0,0490   -0,9477     0,0184   0,4437   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0999 
 
1,6688 
  
0,0994 ** 2,0957 
  
0,0808 ** 2,3412 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0911 
 
1,5480 
  
0,0485 
 
1,1258 
  
0,0409 
 
1,2857 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0393 
 
0,6964 
  
0,0611 
 
1,3888 
  
0,0236 
 
0,7421 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0185 
 
0,3755 
  
0,0660 
 
1,5769 
  
0,0333 
 
1,1182 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0572 
 
1,1059 
  
0,0801 * 1,8399 
  
0,0503 
 
1,6274 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0804 
 
1,4212 
  
0,1236 ** 2,5327 
  
0,0708 ** 2,0359 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0193   -0,2803     0,1051 *** 3,9342     0,0345   1,3836   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0346 
 
-0,5117 
  
0,0691 *** 2,8444 
  
0,0217 
 
0,9443 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0467 
 
-0,7198 
  
0,0476 * 1,9186 
  
0,0092 
 
0,4014 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0116 
 
-0,2042 
  
0,0553 ** 2,3480 
  
0,0076 
 
0,3522 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0402 
 
-0,6752 
  
0,0447 * 1,8221 
  
0,0048 
 
0,2134 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0384   -0,5892     0,0537 * 1,9538     0,0016   0,0628   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0437 
 
0,5649 
  
0,0407 
 
1,3643 
  
0,0562 ** 1,9766 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0086 
 
-0,1138 
  
0,0505 * 1,8632 
  
0,0517 ** 1,9743 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0437 
 
0,5993 
  
0,0472 * 1,7081 
  
0,0571 ** 2,1815 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0541 
 
0,8488 
  
0,0314 
 
1,1928 
  
0,0470 * 1,9189 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0281 
 
0,4198 
  
0,0500 * 1,8264 
  
0,0576 ** 2,2654 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0523 
 
0,7164 
  
0,0611 ** 1,9910 
  
0,0752 *** 2,6295 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0618   -0,7939     0,0086   0,2987     -0,0228   -0,8663   
[t-5, t+5] -0,1061 
 
-1,3884 
  
0,0051 
 
0,1951 
  
-0,0226 
 
-0,9291 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0793 
 
-1,0822 
  
-0,0033 
 
-0,1246 
  
-0,0223 
 
-0,9181 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0010 
 
-0,0161 
  
0,0000 
 
-0,0002 
  
-0,0127 
 
-0,5591 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0359 
 
-0,5347 
  
-0,0149 
 
-0,5639 
  
-0,0249 
 
-1,0533 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0808   -1,1002     -0,0114   -0,3853     -0,0315   -1,1863   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1145 *** 3,0992 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0891 *** 2,6149 
 [t-3, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0848 ** 2,4910 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0641 ** 2,0137 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0861 *** 2,6043 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0974 *** 2,6178 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0458   0,7715     0,0990 *** 3,8998     0,0893 *** 3,8079   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0891 
 
1,5281 
  
0,0784 *** 3,3963 
  
0,0797 *** 3,6871 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0427 
 
0,7644 
  
0,0585 ** 2,4827 
  
0,0563 *** 2,6067 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0304 
 
0,6218 
  
0,0637 *** 2,8442 
  
0,0587 *** 2,9046 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0651 
 
1,2686 
  
0,0639 *** 2,7407 
  
0,0655 *** 3,1212 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0908   1,6196     0,0702 *** 2,6870     0,0750 *** 3,1742   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0871   0,1613   0,1236 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1227 
 
0,1178 
 
0,1028 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0453 
 
0,0746 
 
0,0761 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0436 
 
0,0843 
 
0,0708 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0844 
 
0,0869 
 
0,0937 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1204   0,1031   0,1050 
No. in Sample   47   214   261 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
  
IX 
 
Appendix 6 – Results, Market Model - Scandinavia 
  
Hostile 
 
Friendly 
 
Total  
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1771 ** 2,4664     -0,0088   -0,1739     0,0106   0,2655   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2095 *** 2,9061 
  
0,0405 
 
0,8840 
  
0,0512 
 
1,3764 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2251 *** 3,2891 
  
0,0371 
 
0,8010 
  
0,0630 * 1,6978 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1572 ** 2,6651 
  
0,0343 
 
0,7760 
  
0,0545 
 
1,5761 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1919 *** 2,9004 
  
0,0124 
 
0,2687 
  
0,0352 
 
0,9625 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1718 ** 2,4636     -0,0462   -0,9034     -0,0103   -0,2562   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0890 
 
1,5310 
  
0,0922 * 1,9341 
  
0,0851 ** 2,3627 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0901 
 
1,5437 
  
0,0540 
 
1,2478 
  
0,0601 
 
1,8001 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0552 
 
0,9970 
  
0,0668 
 
1,5290 
  
0,0538 
 
1,6163 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0381 
 
0,7975 
  
0,0673 
 
1,6131 
  
0,0529 * 1,7057 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0694 
 
1,2965 
  
0,0840 * 1,9349 
  
0,0727 ** 2,2136 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0737 
 
1,3054 
  
0,1184 ** 2,4515 
  
0,0927 ** 2,5592 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0458   -0,6847     0,0886 *** 3,2962     0,0687 *** 2,7748   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0617 
 
-0,9178 
  
0,0591 ** 2,4236 
  
0,0432 * 1,8811 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0804 
 
-1,2614 
  
0,0442 * 1,7951 
  
0,0266 
 
1,1612 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0279 
 
-0,5072 
  
0,0458 * 1,9466 
  
0,0339 
 
1,5858 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0600 
 
-0,9741 
  
0,0464 * 1,8983 
  
0,0305 
 
1,3483 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0643   -0,9893     0,0528 * 1,9415     0,0353   1,4174   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0507 
 
0,6752 
  
0,0560 * 1,8695 
  
0,0545 * 1,9627 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0050 
 
-0,0669 
  
0,0529 * 1,9431 
  
0,0424 
 
1,6450 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0103 
 
0,1444 
  
0,0462 * 1,6817 
  
0,0398 
 
1,5506 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0298 
 
0,4835 
  
0,0414 
 
1,5784 
  
0,0399 * 1,6640 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0029 
 
-0,0420 
  
0,0506 * 1,8550 
  
0,0420 * 1,6572 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0310 
 
0,4253 
  
0,0688 ** 2,2663 
  
0,0628 ** 2,2448 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0518   -0,6858     -0,0066   -0,2284     -0,0106   -0,3957   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0999 
 
-1,3171 
  
-0,0045 
 
-0,1693 
  
-0,0146 
 
-0,5871 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0917 
 
-1,2746 
  
-0,0058 
 
-0,2194 
  
-0,0152 
 
-0,6128 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0163 
 
-0,2623 
  
-0,0095 
 
-0,3756 
  
-0,0094 
 
-0,4078 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0622 
 
-0,8936 
  
-0,0136 
 
-0,5156 
  
-0,0177 
 
-0,7209 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0850   -1,1594     -0,0126   -0,4297     -0,0204   -0,7558   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0874 *** 2,6610 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0770 ** 2,5263 
 [t-3, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0826 *** 2,7197 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0514 * 1,8175 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0813 *** 2,7153 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1038 *** 3,1421 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0321   0,5576     0,0807 *** 3,1603     0,0730 *** 3,1502   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0836 
 
1,4457 
  
0,0726 *** 3,1328 
  
0,0736 *** 3,4234 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0681 
 
1,2411 
  
0,0553 ** 2,3643 
  
0,0564 *** 2,6335 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0395 
 
0,8351 
  
0,0626 *** 2,8017 
  
0,0591 *** 2,9604 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0770 
 
1,4512 
  
0,0596 ** 2,5624 
  
0,0623 *** 2,9502 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0900   1,6096     0,0624 ** 2,4148     0,0659 *** 2,8283   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0809 
 
0,1323 
 
0,1264 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1218 
 
0,1035 
 
0,1067 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0952 
 
0,0710 
 
0,0817 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0505 
 
0,0825 
 
0,0805 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1078 
 
0,0863 
 
0,0951 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1181 
 
0,0806 
 
0,1145 
No. in Sample   47   214   261 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
  
X 
 
Appendix 7 – Results, Market Adjusted Return Model - Sweden 
  
Hostile   
 
Friendly 
 
Total Sweden 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1835 ** 2,5200     -0,1380 * -1,7048     -0,0427   -0,7815   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2061 ** 2,3509 
  
-0,0677 
 
-0,9241 
  
-0,0043 
 
-0,0826 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2202 *** 2,8015 
  
-0,0379 
 
-0,5021 
  
0,0372 
 
0,7171 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1686 ** 2,3921 
  
-0,0111 
 
-0,1529 
  
0,0590 
 
1,1962 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1857 ** 2,4789 
  
-0,0420 
 
-0,5534 
  
0,0270 
 
0,5225 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1651 * 2,0463     -0,1391 * -1,7172     -0,0432   -0,7813   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0815 
 
1,3113 
  
0,1956 ** 2,5258 
  
0,1139 ** 2,2761 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1124 
 
1,5024 
  
0,1496 ** 2,1346 
  
0,1048 ** 2,1959 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0507 
 
0,7558 
  
0,1352 * 1,8731 
  
0,0704 
 
1,4797 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0001 
 
-0,0017 
  
0,1154 * 1,6579 
  
0,0455 
 
1,0088 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0508 
 
0,7942 
  
0,1415 * 1,9498 
  
0,0779 
 
1,6475 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0942 
 
1,3686 
  
0,2145 *** 2,7679 
  
0,1293 ** 2,5544 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0670   -0,9798     0,1027 *** 2,9966     0,0712 ** 2,3274   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0957 
 
-1,1615 
  
0,0659 ** 2,1257 
  
0,0383 
 
1,3147 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,1239 
 
-1,6784 
  
0,0441 
 
1,3816 
  
0,0123 
 
0,4223 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0659 
 
-0,9957 
  
0,0410 
 
1,3318 
  
0,0173 
 
0,6257 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1067 
 
-1,5160 
  
0,0466 
 
1,4510 
  
0,0156 
 
0,5390 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1047   -1,3818     0,0567   1,6539     0,0252   0,8151   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0729 
 
0,9798 
  
0,0857 ** 2,3253 
  
0,0887 *** 2,6651 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0281 
 
-0,3140 
  
0,0727 ** 2,1798 
  
0,0577 * 1,8158 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0314 
 
0,3909 
  
0,0577 * 1,6802 
  
0,0561 * 1,7722 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0690 
 
0,9576 
  
0,0383 
 
1,1560 
  
0,0471 
 
1,5687 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0332 
 
0,4342 
  
0,0497 
 
1,4379 
  
0,0498 
 
1,5832 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0428 
 
0,5187 
  
0,0666 * 1,8057 
  
0,0656 * 1,9482 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0002   0,0029     0,0067   0,1808     0,0053   0,1569   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0457 
 
-0,5094 
  
0,0043 
 
0,1275 
  
-0,0021 
 
-0,0644 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0301 
 
-0,3744 
  
0,0014 
 
0,0393 
  
-0,0011 
 
-0,0336 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0384 
 
0,5325 
  
0,0008 
 
0,0228 
  
0,0086 
 
0,2845 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0023 
 
0,0296 
  
-0,0068 
 
-0,1945 
  
-0,0015 
 
-0,0490 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0331   -0,4014     0,0015   0,0401     -0,0025   -0,0732   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1017 *** 2,6060 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0975 *** 2,6191 
 [t-3, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0952 ** 2,5666 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0570 
 
1,6177 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0905 ** 2,4512 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1092 *** 2,7656 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0172   0,2850     0,1131 *** 3,4992     0,0975 *** 3,4179   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0874 
 
1,2045 
  
0,0816 *** 0,0816 
  
0,0855 *** 3,1412 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0471 
 
0,7247 
  
0,0547 * 1,8185 
  
0,0561 ** 2,0685 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0245 
 
0,4198 
  
0,0724 ** 2,4936 
  
0,0660 ** 2,5641 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0608 
 
0,9799 
  
0,0625 ** 2,0646 
  
0,0661 ** 2,4505 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0620   0,9291     0,0795 ** 2,4600     0,0779 *** 2,6979   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1610   0,2373   0,2107 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1549 
 
0,1710 
 
0,1533 
[t-3, t+3] 0,1390 
 
0,0976 
 
0,1038 
[t-1, t+1] 0,1480 
 
0,0970 
 
0,0922 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1681 
 
0,0989 
 
0,1077 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1634   0,1492   0,1453 
No. in Sample   33   133   166 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
  
XI 
 
Appendix 8 – Results, Market Model - Sweden 
  
Hostile   
 
Friendly 
 
Total Sweden 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2283 *** 3,0792     -0,0859   -1,0903     -0,0049   -0,0917   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2304 ** 2,6314 
  
-0,0342 
 
-0,4777 
  
0,0206 
 
0,4012 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2509 *** 3,1391 
  
-0,0041 
 
-0,0556 
  
0,0572 
 
1,1172 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1790 ** 2,6882 
  
-0,0007 
 
-0,0096 
  
0,0600 
 
1,2366 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,2135 ** 2,7102 
  
-0,0272 
 
-0,3626 
  
0,0340 
 
0,6538 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1992 ** 2,3900     -0,1093   -1,4032     -0,0188   -0,3481   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0621 
 
0,9809 
  
0,1521 ** 2,0177 
  
0,0843 * 1,7105 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1001 
 
1,3393 
  
0,1228 * 1,7931 
  
0,0865 * 1,8431 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0628 
 
0,9209 
  
0,1071 
 
1,5268 
  
0,0607 
 
1,2942 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0188 
 
0,3314 
  
0,1057 
 
1,5265 
  
0,0485 
 
1,0911 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0726 
 
1,0797 
  
0,1272 * 1,7709 
  
0,0775 
 
1,6292 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0817 
 
1,1486 
  
0,1839 ** 2,4681 
  
0,1062 ** 2,1454 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,1023   -1,4679     0,0879 *** 2,6352     0,0532   1,7644   
[t-5, t+5] -0,1196 
 
-1,4545 
  
0,0580 * 1,9166 
  
0,0280 
 
0,9759 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,1481 * -1,9724 
  
0,0395 
 
1,2741 
  
0,0061 
 
0,2121 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0796 
 
-1,2730 
  
0,0401 
 
1,3087 
  
0,0155 
 
0,5694 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1365 * -1,8451 
  
0,0438 
 
1,3801 
  
0,0102 
 
0,3505 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1284   -1,6406     0,0523   1,5877     0,0179   0,5923   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0805 
 
1,0619 
  
0,0864 ** 2,4090 
  
0,0914 *** 2,7863 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0205 
 
-0,2293 
  
0,0714 ** 2,1916 
  
0,0587 * 1,8805 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0080 
 
-0,0978 
  
0,0562 * 1,6826 
  
0,0482 
 
1,5450 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0451 
 
0,6631 
  
0,0411 
 
1,2466 
  
0,0450 
 
1,5222 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0069 
 
-0,0860 
  
0,0517 
 
1,5124 
  
0,0444 
 
1,4022 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0242 
 
0,2837 
  
0,0706 ** 1,9904 
  
0,0659 ** 1,9994 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0094   0,1234     -0,0051   -0,1412     -0,0023   -0,0706   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0385 
 
-0,4291 
  
-0,0054 
 
-0,1646 
  
-0,0087 
 
-0,2757 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0332 
 
-0,4053 
  
-0,0006 
 
-0,0190 
  
-0,0027 
 
-0,0867 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0223 
 
0,3276 
  
-0,0014 
 
-0,0432 
  
0,0046 
 
0,1538 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0223 
 
-0,2760 
  
-0,0060 
 
-0,1745 
  
-0,0044 
 
-0,1394 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0309   -0,3622     -0,0009   -0,0244     -0,0032   -0,0970   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1104 *** 2,8691 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0952 ** 2,6001 
 [t-3, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0921 ** 2,5187 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0593 * 1,7096 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0925 ** 2,4934 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,1112 *** 2,8781 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0110   -0,1800     0,1013 *** 3,2201     0,0845 *** 3,0069   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0663 
 
0,9155 
  
0,0815 *** 2,8550 
  
0,0829 ** 3,0953 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0539 
 
0,8152 
  
0,0574 * 1,9601 
  
0,0610 ** 2,2799 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0356 
 
0,6453 
  
0,0694 ** 2,4026 
  
0,0662 *** 2,6110 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0769 
 
1,1802 
  
0,0624 ** 2,0829 
  
0,0698 ** 2,5732 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0629   0,9121     0,0724 ** 2,3298     0,0735 ** 2,6043   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1814 
 
0,2074 
 
0,1900 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1472 
 
0,1596 
 
0,1439 
[t-3, t+3] 0,1722 
 
0,0919 
 
0,0999 
[t-1, t+1] 0,1464 
 
0,0933 
 
0,0926 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1940 
 
0,0963 
 
0,1059 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1624 
 
0,1414 
 
0,1396 
No. in Sample   33   133   166 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
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Appendix 9 – Results, Market Average Return Model - Norway 
  
Hostile   
 
Friendly 
 
Total Norway 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2728   1,2223     0,0975   1,4840     0,0989   1,6269   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2720 
 
1,8001 
  
0,1140 * 1,8325 
  
0,1143 
 
2,0562 
 t-3, t+3 0,2915 
 
1,7692 
  
0,0823 
 
1,2890 
  
0,0916 
 
1,5974 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,2159 
 
1,8066 
  
0,0573 
 
0,9678 
  
0,0583 
 
1,1272 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,2297 
 
1,8403 
  
0,0444 
 
0,7179 
  
0,0425 
 
0,7851 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,2380   1,3862     0,0119   0,1615     0,0096   0,1467   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2000 
 
1,1337 
  
0,0429 
 
0,7206 
  
0,0495 
 
0,9296 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1770 
 
1,4822 
  
-0,0190 
 
-0,3376 
  
-0,0086 
 
-0,1769 
 t-3, t+3 0,1684 
 
1,2930 
  
0,0118 
 
0,2040 
  
0,0135 
 
0,2697 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1590 
 
1,6839 
  
0,0252 
 
0,4694 
  
0,0341 
 
0,7528 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1798 
 
1,8231 
  
0,0339 
 
0,6046 
  
0,0468 
 
0,9881 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1600 
 
1,1795 
  
0,0556 
 
0,8295 
  
0,0604 
 
1,0574 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1404   0,7603     0,1040 ** 2,4468     0,1144 *** 2,7807   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0921 
 
0,7373 
  
0,0782 * 1,9439 
  
0,0870 ** 2,3113 
 t-3, t+3 0,1504 
 
1,1037 
  
0,0601 
 
1,4538 
  
0,0736 * 1,8968 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1574 
 
1,5922 
  
0,0775 ** 2,0214 
  
0,0876 ** 2,5019 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1567 
 
1,5185 
  
0,0449 
 
1,1229 
  
0,0572 
 
1,5615 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1332   0,9381     0,0460   0,9621     0,0598   1,3549   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] -0,2631 
 
-0,9343 
  
-0,0503 
 
-0,9488 
  
-0,0596 
 
-1,1353 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,1413 
 
-0,7412 
  
0,0040 
 
0,0953 
  
0,0043 
 
0,0898 
 t-3, t+3 -0,1481 
 
-0,7127 
  
0,0293 
 
0,5675 
  
0,0212 
 
0,4271 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,1599 
 
-1,0609 
  
0,0274 
 
0,5732 
  
0,0174 
 
0,3903 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1839 
 
-1,1680 
  
0,0588 
 
1,1800 
  
0,0457 
 
0,9788 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1840 
 
-0,8498 
  
0,0620 
 
1,0395 
  
0,0529 
 
0,9395 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,2200   -0,9397     0,0053   0,1190     -0,0110   -0,2529   
[t-5, t+5] -0,2523 
 
-1,5920 
  
0,0040 
 
0,0953 
  
-0,0137 
 
-0,3460 
 t-3, t+3 -0,1871 
 
-1,0826 
  
-0,0108 
 
-0,2499 
  
-0,0287 
 
-0,7004 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,1111 
 
-0,8862 
  
-0,0010 
 
-0,0236 
  
-0,0107 
 
-0,2897 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1161 
 
-0,8868 
  
-0,0289 
 
-0,6909 
  
-0,0369 
 
-0,9540 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1743   -0,9678     -0,0355   -0,7113     -0,0466   -1,0006   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0221 
 
0,3669 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0245 
 
0,4443 
 t-3, t+3 N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0601 
 
1,0562 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0337 
 
0,6560 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0432 
 
0,8053 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0968 
 
1,4962 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1445   1,0722     0,0557   1,3120     0,0624   1,5672   
[t-5, t+5] 0,1006 
 
1,1030 
  
0,0685 * 1,7018 
  
0,0678 * 1,8605 
 t-3, t+3 0,0326 
 
0,3273 
  
0,0684 
 
1,6551 
  
0,0575 
 
1,5297 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0485 
 
0,6722 
  
0,0486 
 
1,2687 
  
0,0447 
 
1,3189 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0770 
 
1,0226 
  
0,0665 
 
1,6632 
  
0,0641 * 1,8092 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1768   1,7058     0,0455   0,9529     0,0596   1,3960   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,3998 
 
0,0969 
 
0,1187 
[t-5, t+5] 0,5315 
 
0,0779 
 
0,1079 
t-3, t+3 0,4797 
 
0,0646 
 
0,1016 
[t-1, t+1] 0,5507 
 
0,0783 
 
0,1045 
[t-1, t+3] 0,5559 
 
0,0800 
 
0,1049 
[t-1, t+10] 0,4876 
 
0,0576 
 
0,1046 
No. in Sample   14   81   95 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
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Appendix 10 – Results, Market Model – Norway 
  
Hostile   
 
Friendly 
 
Total Norway 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2088   1,2836     0,0792   1,1029     0,0764   1,2057   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2423 
 
1,6867 
  
0,1043 
 
1,5743 
  
0,1016 * 1,7395 
 t-3, t+3 0,2367 
 
1,5935 
  
0,0697 
 
1,0492 
  
0,0762 
 
1,3046 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,2125 
 
1,6643 
  
0,0532 
 
0,8878 
  
0,0762 
 
1,3046 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,2147 * 1,8905 
  
0,0345 
 
0,5497 
  
0,0376 
 
0,6903 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,2218   1,6041     -0,0058   -0,0753     0,0001   0,0011   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1721 
 
1,3388 
  
0,0570 
 
0,8762 
  
0,0616 
 
1,1125 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1814 
 
1,5981 
  
0,0089 
 
0,1481 
  
0,0184 
 
0,3600 
 t-3, t+3 0,1657 
 
1,4119 
  
0,0383 
 
0,6366 
  
0,0374 
 
0,7324 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1699 
 
1,6832 
  
0,0358 
 
0,6588 
  
0,0374 
 
0,7324 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1639 
 
1,8254 
  
0,0494 
 
0,8690 
  
0,0550 
 
1,1521 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1468 
 
1,3431 
  
0,0663 
 
0,9517 
  
0,0642 
 
1,1005 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1445   1,0740     0,0788   1,6953     0,0918 ** 2,1423   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0593 
 
0,4995 
  
0,0591 
 
1,3785 
  
0,0672 * 1,7006 
 t-3, t+3 0,0683 
 
0,5560 
  
0,0519 
 
1,2096 
  
0,0608 
 
1,5388 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1343 
 
1,2715 
  
0,0529 
 
1,3642 
  
0,0608 
 
1,5388 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1563 
 
1,6636 
  
0,0504 
 
1,2412 
  
0,0628 * 1,7013 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0990   0,8659     0,0494   0,9937     0,0596   1,3214   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] -0,2154 
 
-1,0496 
  
-0,0054 
 
-0,0930 
  
-0,0126 
 
-0,2307 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,1246 
 
-0,6878 
  
0,0193 
 
0,3619 
  
0,0129 
 
0,2551 
 t-3, t+3 -0,0990 
 
-0,5284 
  
0,0299 
 
0,5583 
  
0,0256 
 
0,5074 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,1641 
 
-1,0186 
  
0,0489 
 
1,0111 
  
0,0256 
 
0,5074 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1692 
 
-1,1809 
  
0,0562 
 
1,1091 
  
0,0455 
 
0,9667 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1592 
 
-0,9128 
  
0,0768 
 
1,2377 
  
0,0684 
 
1,1884 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,1859   -1,0893     -0,0147   -0,3035     -0,0275   -0,6087   
[t-5, t+5] -0,2585 
 
-1,7158 
  
-0,0059 
 
-0,1313 
  
-0,0221 
 
-0,5308 
 t-3, t+3 -0,2395 
 
-1,5370 
  
-0,0152 
 
-0,3383 
  
-0,0331 
 
-0,7938 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,1221 
 
-0,9114 
  
-0,0227 
 
-0,5597 
  
-0,0331 
 
-0,7938 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1182 
 
-0,9919 
  
-0,0266 
 
-0,6262 
  
-0,0365 
 
-0,9371 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1964   -1,3542     -0,0339   -0,6522     -0,0473   -0,0473   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0155 
 
0,2465 
 [t-5, t+5] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0258 
 
0,4457 
 t-3, t+3 N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0472 
 
0,8140 
 [t-1, t+1] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0472 
 
0,8140 
 [t-1, t+3] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0391 
 
0,7237 
 [t-1, t+10] N/A 
 
N/A 
  
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
0,0701 
 
0,0701 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1547   1,5758     0,0255   0,5498     0,0395   0,9524   
[t-5, t+5] 0,1297 
 
1,4963 
  
0,0488 
 
1,1390 
  
0,0556 
 
1,4542 
 t-3, t+3 0,0982 
 
1,0954 
  
0,0495 
 
1,1519 
  
0,0508 
 
1,3270 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0509 
 
0,6607 
  
0,0499 
 
1,2874 
  
0,0508 
 
1,3270 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0716 
 
1,0445 
  
0,0532 
 
1,3103 
  
0,0513 
 
1,4365 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1667 * 1,9968     0,0382   0,7694     0,0502   1,1491   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,5239 
 
0,0548 
 
0,0813 
[t-5, t+5] 0,5362 
 
0,0427 
 
0,0687 
t-3, t+3 0,4836 
 
0,0482 
 
0,0753 
[t-1, t+1] 0,4959 
 
0,0713 
 
0,0753 
[t-1, t+3] 0,5921 
 
0,0759 
 
0,0993 
[t-1, t+10] 0,5627 
 
0,0644 
 
0,0912 
No. in Sample   14   81   95 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
               
                 
  
XIV 
 
Appendix 11 – Results, Market Adjusted Return Model – Total 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0427   -0,7815     0,0989   1,6269     0,0156   0,3803   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0043 
 
-0,0826 
  
0,1143 
 
2,0562 
  
0,0651 * 1,7202 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0372 
 
0,7171 
  
0,0916 
 
1,5974 
  
0,0852 ** 2,2519 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0590 
 
1,1962 
  
0,0583 
 
1,1272 
  
0,0748 ** 2,1139 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0270 
 
0,5225 
  
0,0425 
 
0,7851 
  
0,0554 
 
1,5052 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0432   -0,7813     0,0096   0,1467     0,0184   0,4437   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1139 ** 2,2761 
  
0,0495 
 
0,9296 
  
0,0808 ** 2,3412 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1048 ** 2,1959 
  
-0,0086 
 
-0,1769 
  
0,0409 
 
1,2857 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0704 
 
1,4797 
  
0,0135 
 
0,2697 
  
0,0236 
 
0,7421 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0455 
 
1,0088 
  
0,0341 
 
0,7528 
  
0,0333 
 
1,1182 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0779 
 
1,6475 
  
0,0468 
 
0,9881 
  
0,0503 
 
1,6274 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1293 ** 2,5544 
  
0,0604 
 
1,0574 
  
0,0708 ** 2,0359 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0712 ** 2,3274     0,1144 *** 2,7807     0,0345   1,3836   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0383 
 
1,3147 
  
0,0870 ** 2,3113 
  
0,0217 
 
0,9443 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0123 
 
0,4223 
  
0,0736 * 1,8968 
  
0,0092 
 
0,4014 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0173 
 
0,6257 
  
0,0876 ** 2,5019 
  
0,0076 
 
0,3522 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0156 
 
0,5390 
  
0,0572 
 
1,5615 
  
0,0048 
 
0,2134 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0252   0,8151     0,0598   1,3549     0,0016   0,0628   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0887 *** 2,6651 
  
-0,0596 
 
-1,1353 
  
0,0562 ** 1,9766 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0577 * 1,8158 
  
0,0043 
 
0,0898 
  
0,0517 ** 1,9743 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0561 * 1,7722 
  
0,0212 
 
0,4271 
  
0,0571 ** 2,1815 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0471 
 
1,5687 
  
0,0174 
 
0,3903 
  
0,0470 * 1,9189 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0498 
 
1,5832 
  
0,0457 
 
0,9788 
  
0,0576 ** 2,2654 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0656 * 1,9482 
  
0,0529 
 
0,9395 
  
0,0752 *** 2,6295 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0053   0,1569     -0,0110   -0,2529     -0,0228   -0,8663   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0021 
 
-0,0644 
  
-0,0137 
 
-0,3460 
  
-0,0226 
 
-0,9291 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0011 
 
-0,0336 
  
-0,0287 
 
-0,7004 
  
-0,0223 
 
-0,9181 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0086 
 
0,2845 
  
-0,0107 
 
-0,2897 
  
-0,0127 
 
-0,5591 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0015 
 
-0,0490 
  
-0,0369 
 
-0,9540 
  
-0,0249 
 
-1,0533 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0025   -0,0732     -0,0466   -1,0006     -0,0315   -1,1863   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1017 *** 2,6060 
  
0,0221 
 
0,3669 
  
0,1145 *** 3,0992 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0975 *** 2,6191 
  
0,0245 
 
0,4443 
  
0,0891 *** 2,6149 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0952 ** 2,5666 
  
0,0601 
 
1,0562 
  
0,0848 ** 2,4910 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0570 
 
1,6177 
  
0,0337 
 
0,6560 
  
0,0641 ** 2,0137 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0905 ** 2,4512 
  
0,0432 
 
0,8053 
  
0,0861 *** 2,6043 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1092 *** 2,7656 
  
0,0968 
 
1,4962 
  
0,0974 *** 2,6178 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0975 *** 3,4179     0,0624   1,5672     0,0893 *** 3,8079   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0855 *** 3,1412 
  
0,0678 * 1,8605 
  
0,0797 *** 3,6871 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0561 ** 2,0685 
  
0,0575 
 
1,5297 
  
0,0563 *** 2,6067 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0660 ** 2,5641 
  
0,0447 
 
1,3189 
  
0,0587 *** 2,9046 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0661 ** 2,4505 
  
0,0641 * 1,8092 
  
0,0655 *** 3,1212 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0779 *** 2,6979     0,0596   1,3960     0,0750 *** 3,1742   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2107 
 
0,1187 
 
0,1236 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1533 
 
0,1079 
 
0,1028 
[t-3, t+3] 0,1038 
 
0,1016 
 
0,0761 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0922 
 
0,1045 
 
0,0708 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1077 
 
0,1049 
 
0,0937 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1453 
 
0,1046 
 
0,1050 
No. in Sample   166   95   261 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
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Appendix 12 - Results, Market Model – Total 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia  
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0049   -0,0917     0,0764   1,2057     0,0106   0,2655   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0206 
 
0,4012 
  
0,1016 * 1,7395 
  
0,0512 
 
1,3764 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0572 
 
1,1172 
  
0,0762 
 
1,3046 
  
0,0630 * 1,6978 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0600 
 
1,2366 
  
0,0762 
 
1,3046 
  
0,0545 
 
1,5761 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0340 
 
0,6538 
  
0,0376 
 
0,6903 
  
0,0352 
 
0,9625 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0188   -0,3481     0,0001   0,0011     -0,0103   -0,2562   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0843 * 1,7105 
  
0,0616 
 
1,1125 
  
0,0851 ** 2,3627 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0865 * 1,8431 
  
0,0184 
 
0,3600 
  
0,0601 * 1,8001 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0607 
 
1,2942 
  
0,0374 
 
0,7324 
  
0,0538 
 
1,6163 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0485 
 
1,0911 
  
0,0374 
 
0,7324 
  
0,0529 * 1,7057 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0775 
 
1,6292 
  
0,0550 
 
1,1521 
  
0,0727 ** 2,2136 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1062 ** 2,1454 
  
0,0642 
 
1,1005 
  
0,0927 ** 2,5592 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0532 * 1,7644     0,0918 ** 2,1423     0,0687 *** 2,7748   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0280 
 
0,9759 
  
0,0672 * 1,7006 
  
0,0432 * 1,8811 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0061 
 
0,2121 
  
0,0608 
 
1,5388 
  
0,0266 
 
1,1612 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0155 
 
0,5694 
  
0,0608 
 
1,5388 
  
0,0339 
 
1,5858 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0102 
 
0,3505 
  
0,0628 * 1,7013 
  
0,0305 
 
1,3483 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0179   0,5923     0,0596   1,3214     0,0353   1,4174   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0914 *** 2,7863 
  
-0,0126 
 
-0,2307 
  
0,0545 * 1,9627 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0587 * 1,8805 
  
0,0129 
 
0,2551 
  
0,0424 
 
1,6450 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0482 
 
1,5450 
  
0,0256 
 
0,5074 
  
0,0398 
 
1,5506 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0450 
 
1,5222 
  
0,0256 
 
0,5074 
  
0,0399 * 1,6640 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0444 
 
1,4022 
  
0,0455 
 
0,9667 
  
0,0420 * 1,6572 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0659 ** 1,9994 
  
0,0684 
 
1,1884 
  
0,0628 ** 2,2448 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0023   -0,0706     -0,0275   -0,6087     -0,0106   -0,3957   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0087 
 
-0,2757 
  
-0,0221 
 
-0,5308 
  
-0,0146 
 
-0,5871 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0027 
 
-0,0867 
  
-0,0331 
 
-0,7938 
  
-0,0152 
 
-0,6128 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0046 
 
0,1538 
  
-0,0331 
 
-0,7938 
  
-0,0094 
 
-0,4078 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0044 
 
-0,1394 
  
-0,0365 
 
-0,9371 
  
-0,0177 
 
-0,7209 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0032   -0,0970     -0,0473   -0,0473     -0,0204   -0,7558   
Friendly/Hostile 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1104 *** 2,8691 
  
0,0155 
 
0,2465 
  
0,0874 *** 2,6610 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0952 ** 2,6001 
  
0,0258 
 
0,4457 
  
0,0770 ** 2,5263 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0921 ** 2,5187 
  
0,0472 
 
0,8140 
  
0,0826 *** 2,7197 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0593 * 1,7096 
  
0,0472 
 
0,8140 
  
0,0514 * 1,8175 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0925 ** 2,4934 
  
0,0391 
 
0,7237 
  
0,0813 *** 2,7153 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1112 *** 2,8781 
  
0,0701 
 
0,0701 
  
0,1038 *** 3,1421 
 
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0845 *** 3,0069     0,0395   0,9524     0,0730 *** 3,1502   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0829 ** 3,0953 
  
0,0556 
 
1,4542 
  
0,0736 *** 3,4234 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0610 ** 2,2799 
  
0,0508 
 
1,3270 
  
0,0564 *** 2,6335 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0662 *** 2,6110 
  
0,0508 
 
1,3270 
  
0,0591 *** 2,9604 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0698 ** 2,5732 
  
0,0513 
 
1,4365 
  
0,0623 *** 2,9502 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0735 ** 2,6043     0,0502   1,1491     0,0659 *** 2,8283   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1900 
 
0,0813 
 
0,1264 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1439 
 
0,0687 
 
0,1067 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0999 
 
0,0753 
 
0,0817 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0926 
 
0,0753 
 
0,0805 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1059 
 
0,0993 
 
0,0951 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1396 
 
0,0912 
 
0,1145 
No. in Sample   166   95   261 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
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Appendix 13 - Results, Market Adjusted Return Model – Hostile 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1835 ** 2,5200     0,2728   1,2223     0,1565 ** 2,1148   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2061 ** 2,3509 
  
0,2720 
 
1,8001 
  
0,2021 *** 2,7805 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2202 *** 2,8015 
  
0,2915 
 
1,7692 
  
0,2109 *** 3,0266 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1686 ** 2,3921 
  
0,2159 
 
1,8066 
  
0,1466 ** 2,4030 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1857 ** 2,4789 
  
0,2297 
 
1,8403 
  
0,1654 ** 2,5873 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1651 * 2,0463     0,2380   1,3862     0,1436 ** 2,0556   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0815 
 
1,3113 
  
0,2000 
 
1,1337 
  
0,0999 
 
1,6688 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1124 
 
1,5024 
  
0,1770 
 
1,4822 
  
0,0911 
 
1,5480 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0507 
 
0,7558 
  
0,1684 
 
1,2930 
  
0,0393 
 
0,6964 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0001 
 
-0,0017 
  
0,1590 
 
1,6839 
  
0,0185 
 
0,3755 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0508 
 
0,7942 
  
0,1798 
 
1,8231 
  
0,0572 
 
1,1059 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0942 
 
1,3686 
  
0,1600 
 
1,1795 
  
0,0804 
 
1,4212 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0670   -0,9798     0,1404   0,7603     -0,0193   0,5649   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0957 
 
-1,1615 
  
0,0921 
 
0,7373 
  
-0,0346 
 
-0,5117 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,1239 
 
-1,6784 
  
0,1504 
 
1,1037 
  
-0,0467 
 
-0,7198 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0659 
 
-0,9957 
  
0,1574 
 
1,5922 
  
-0,0116 
 
-0,2042 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1067 
 
-1,5160 
  
0,1567 
 
1,5185 
  
-0,0402 
 
-0,6752 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1047   -1,3818     0,1332   0,9381     -0,0384   -0,5892   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0729 
 
0,9798 
  
-0,2631 
 
-0,9343 
  
0,0437 
 
0,5649 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0281 
 
-0,3140 
  
-0,1413 
 
-0,7412 
  
-0,0086 
 
-0,1138 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0314 
 
0,3909 
  
-0,1481 
 
-0,7127 
  
0,0437 
 
0,5993 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0690 
 
0,9576 
  
-0,1599 
 
-1,0609 
  
0,0541 
 
0,8488 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0332 
 
0,4342 
  
-0,1839 
 
-1,1680 
  
0,0281 
 
0,4198 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0428 
 
0,5187 
  
-0,1840 
 
-0,8498 
  
0,0523 
 
0,7164 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0002   0,0029     -0,2200   -0,9397     -0,0618   -0,7939   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0457 
 
-0,5094 
  
-0,2523 
 
-1,5920 
  
-0,1061 
 
-1,3884 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0301 
 
-0,3744 
  
-0,1871 
 
-1,0826 
  
-0,0793 
 
-1,0822 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0384 
 
0,5325 
  
-0,1111 
 
-0,8862 
  
-0,0010 
 
-0,0161 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0023 
 
0,0296 
  
-0,1161 
 
-0,8868 
  
-0,0359 
 
-0,5347 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0331   -0,4014     -0,1743   -0,9678     -0,0808   -1,1002   
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0172   0,2850     0,1445   1,0722     0,0458   0,7715   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0874 
 
1,2045 
  
0,1006 
 
1,1030 
  
0,0891 
 
1,5281 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0471 
 
0,7247 
  
0,0326 
 
0,3273 
  
0,0427 
 
0,7644 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0245 
 
0,4198 
  
0,0485 
 
0,6722 
  
0,0304 
 
0,6218 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0608 
 
0,9799 
  
0,0770 
 
1,0226 
  
0,0651 
 
1,2686 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0620   0,9291     0,1768   1,7058     0,0908   1,6196   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1610 
 
0,3998 
 
0,0871 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1549 
 
0,5315 
 
0,1227 
[t-3, t+3] 0,1390 
 
0,4797 
 
0,0453 
[t-1, t+1] 0,1480 
 
0,5507 
 
0,0436 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1681 
 
0,5559 
 
0,0844 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1634 
 
0,4876 
 
0,1204 
No. in Sample   33   14   47 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
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Appendix 14 – Results, Market Model - Hostile 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2283 *** 3,0792     0,2088   1,2836     0,1771 ** 2,4664   
[t-5, t+5] 0,2304 ** 2,6314 
  
0,2423 
 
1,6867 
  
0,2095 *** 2,9061 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,2509 *** 3,1391 
  
0,2367 
 
1,5935 
  
0,2251 *** 3,2891 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1790 ** 2,6882 
  
0,2125 
 
1,6643 
  
0,1572 ** 2,6651 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,2135 ** 2,7102 
  
0,2147 * 1,8905 
  
0,1919 *** 2,9004 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1992 ** 2,3900     0,2218   1,6041     0,1718 ** 2,4636   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0621 
 
0,9809 
  
0,1721 
 
1,3388 
  
0,0890 
 
1,5310 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1001 
 
1,3393 
  
0,1814 
 
1,5981 
  
0,0901 
 
1,5437 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0628 
 
0,9209 
  
0,1657 
 
1,4119 
  
0,0552 
 
0,9970 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0188 
 
0,3314 
  
0,1699 
 
1,6832 
  
0,0381 
 
0,7975 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0726 
 
1,0797 
  
0,1639 
 
1,8254 
  
0,0694 
 
1,2965 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0817 
 
1,1486 
  
0,1468 
 
1,3431 
  
0,0737 
 
1,3054 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] -0,1023   -1,4679     0,1445   1,0740     -0,0458   -0,6847   
[t-5, t+5] -0,1196 
 
-1,4545 
  
0,0593 
 
0,4995 
  
-0,0617 
 
-0,9178 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,1481 * -1,9724 
  
0,0683 
 
0,5560 
  
-0,0804 
 
-1,2614 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0796 
 
-1,2730 
  
0,1343 
 
1,2715 
  
-0,0279 
 
-0,5072 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,1365 * -1,8451 
  
0,1563 
 
1,6636 
  
-0,0600 
 
-0,9741 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1284   -1,6406     0,0990   0,8659     -0,0643   -0,9893   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0805 
 
1,0619 
  
-0,2154 
 
-1,0496 
  
0,0507 
 
0,6752 
 [t-5, t+5] -0,0205 
 
-0,2293 
  
-0,1246 
 
-0,6878 
  
-0,0050 
 
-0,0669 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0080 
 
-0,0978 
  
-0,0990 
 
-0,5284 
  
0,0103 
 
0,1444 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0451 
 
0,6631 
  
-0,1641 
 
-1,0186 
  
0,0298 
 
0,4835 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0069 
 
-0,0860 
  
-0,1692 
 
-1,1809 
  
-0,0029 
 
-0,0420 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0242 
 
0,2837 
  
-0,1592 
 
-0,9128 
  
0,0310 
 
0,4253 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0094   0,1234     -0,1859   -1,0893     -0,0518   -0,6858   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0385 
 
-0,4291 
  
-0,2585 
 
-1,7158 
  
-0,0999 
 
-1,3171 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0332 
 
-0,4053 
  
-0,2395 
 
-1,5370 
  
-0,0917 
 
-1,2746 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0223 
 
0,3276 
  
-0,1221 
 
-0,9114 
  
-0,0163 
 
-0,2623 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0223 
 
-0,2760 
  
-0,1182 
 
-0,9919 
  
-0,0622 
 
-0,8936 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0309   -0,3622     -0,1964   -1,3542     -0,0850   -1,1594   
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0110   -0,1800     0,1547   1,5758     0,0321   0,5576   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0663 
 
0,9155 
  
0,1297 
 
1,4963 
  
0,0836 
 
1,4457 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0539 
 
0,8152 
  
0,0982 
 
1,0954 
  
0,0681 
 
1,2411 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0356 
 
0,6453 
  
0,0509 
 
0,6607 
  
0,0395 
 
0,8351 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0769 
 
1,1802 
  
0,0716 
 
1,0445 
  
0,0770 
 
1,4512 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0629   0,9121     0,1667 * 1,9968     0,0900   1,6096   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1814 
 
0,5239 
 
0,0809 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1472 
 
0,5362 
 
0,1218 
[t-3, t+3] 0,1722 
 
0,4836 
 
0,0952 
[t-1, t+1] 0,1464 
 
0,4959 
 
0,0505 
[t-1, t+3] 0,1940 
 
0,5921 
 
0,1078 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1624 
 
0,5627 
 
0,1181 
No. in Sample   33   14   47 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
  
XVIII 
 
Appendix 15 – Results, Market Adjusted Return Model – Friendly 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0859   -1,0903     0,0792   1,1029     -0,0088   -0,1739   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0342 
 
-0,4777 
  
0,1043 
 
1,5743 
  
0,0405 
 
0,8840 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0041 
 
-0,0556 
  
0,0697 
 
1,0492 
  
0,0371 
 
0,8010 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0007 
 
-0,0096 
  
0,0532 
 
0,8878 
  
0,0343 
 
0,7760 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0272 
 
-0,3626 
  
0,0345 
 
0,5497 
  
0,0124 
 
0,2687 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1093   -1,4032     -0,0058   -0,0753     -0,0462   -0,9034   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1521 ** 2,0177 
  
0,0570 
 
0,8762 
  
0,0922 * 1,9341 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1228 * 1,7931 
  
0,0089 
 
0,1481 
  
0,0540 
 
1,2478 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,1071 
 
1,5268 
  
0,0383 
 
0,6366 
  
0,0668 
 
1,5290 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1057 
 
1,5265 
  
0,0358 
 
0,6588 
  
0,0673 
 
1,6131 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1272 * 1,7709 
  
0,0494 
 
0,8690 
  
0,0840 * 1,9349 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1839 ** 2,4681 
  
0,0663 
 
0,9517 
  
0,1184 ** 2,4515 
 
Country of 
Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0879 *** 2,6352     0,0788   1,6953     0,0886 *** 3,2962   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0580 * 1,9166 
  
0,0591 
 
1,3785 
  
0,0591 ** 2,4236 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0395 
 
1,2741 
  
0,0519 
 
1,2096 
  
0,0442 * 1,7951 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0401 
 
1,3087 
  
0,0529 
 
1,3642 
  
0,0458 * 1,9466 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0438 
 
1,3801 
  
0,0504 
 
1,2412 
  
0,0464 * 1,8983 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0523   1,5877     0,0494   0,9937     0,0528 * 1,9415   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0864 ** 2,4090 
  
-0,0054 
 
-0,0930 
  
0,0560 * 1,8695 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0714 ** 2,1916 
  
0,0193 
 
0,3619 
  
0,0529 * 1,9431 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0562 * 1,6826 
  
0,0299 
 
0,5583 
  
0,0462 * 1,6817 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0411 
 
1,2466 
  
0,0489 
 
1,0111 
  
0,0414 
 
1,5784 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0517 
 
1,5124 
  
0,0562 
 
1,1091 
  
0,0506 * 1,8550 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0706 ** 1,9904 
  
0,0768 
 
1,2377 
  
0,0688 ** 2,2663 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0051   -0,1412     -0,0147   -0,3035     -0,0066   -0,2284   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0054 
 
-0,1646 
  
-0,0059 
 
-0,1313 
  
-0,0045 
 
-0,1693 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0006 
 
-0,0190 
  
-0,0152 
 
-0,3383 
  
-0,0058 
 
-0,2194 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0014 
 
-0,0432 
  
-0,0227 
 
-0,5597 
  
-0,0095 
 
-0,3756 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0060 
 
-0,1745 
  
-0,0266 
 
-0,6262 
  
-0,0136 
 
-0,5156 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0009   -0,0244     -0,0339   -0,6522     -0,0126   -0,4297   
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1013 *** 3,2201     0,0255   0,5498     0,0807 *** 3,1603   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0815 *** 2,8550 
  
0,0488 
 
1,1390 
  
0,0726 *** 3,1328 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0574 * 1,9601 
  
0,0495 
 
1,1519 
  
0,0553 ** 2,3643 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0694 ** 2,4026 
  
0,0499 
 
1,2874 
  
0,0626 *** 2,8017 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0624 ** 2,0829 
  
0,0532 
 
1,3103 
  
0,0596 ** 2,5624 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0724 ** 2,3298     0,0382   0,7694     0,0624 ** 2,4148   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2074 
 
0,0548 
 
0,1323 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1596 
 
0,0427 
 
0,1035 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0919 
 
0,0482 
 
0,0710 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0933 
 
0,0713 
 
0,0825 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0963 
 
0,0759 
 
0,0863 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1414 
 
0,0644 
 
0,0806 
No. in Sample   133   81   214 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
  
XIX 
 
Appendix 16 – Results, Market Model - Friendly 
  
Sweden 
 
Norway 
 
Scandinavia 
  
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0859   -1,0903     0,0792   1,1029     -0,0088   -0,1739   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0342 
 
-0,4777 
  
0,1043 
 
1,5743 
  
0,0405 
 
0,8840 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0041 
 
-0,0556 
  
0,0697 
 
1,0492 
  
0,0371 
 
0,8010 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0007 
 
-0,0096 
  
0,0532 
 
0,8878 
  
0,0343 
 
0,7760 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0272 
 
-0,3626 
  
0,0345 
 
0,5497 
  
0,0124 
 
0,2687 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,1093   -1,4032     -0,0058   -0,0753     -0,0462   -0,9034   
Successfulness 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1521 ** 2,0177 
  
0,0570 
 
0,8762 
  
0,0922 * 1,9341 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,1228 * 1,7931 
  
0,0089 
 
0,1481 
  
0,0540 
 
1,2478 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,1071 
 
1,5268 
  
0,0383 
 
0,6366 
  
0,0668 
 
1,5290 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,1057 
 
1,5265 
  
0,0358 
 
0,6588 
  
0,0673 
 
1,6131 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,1272 * 1,7709 
  
0,0494 
 
0,8690 
  
0,0840 * 1,9349 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,1839 ** 2,4681 
  
0,0663 
 
0,9517 
  
0,1184 ** 2,4515 
 
Country of Acquirer 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0879 *** 2,6352     0,0788   1,6953     0,0886 *** 3,2962   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0580 * 1,9166 
  
0,0591 
 
1,3785 
  
0,0591 ** 2,4236 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0395 
 
1,2741 
  
0,0519 
 
1,2096 
  
0,0442 * 1,7951 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0401 
 
1,3087 
  
0,0529 
 
1,3642 
  
0,0458 * 1,9466 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0438 
 
1,3801 
  
0,0504 
 
1,2412 
  
0,0464 * 1,8983 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0523   1,5877     0,0494   0,9937     0,0528 * 1,9415   
Payment Method 
[t-10, t+10] 0,0864 ** 2,4090 
  
-0,0054 
 
-0,0930 
  
0,0560 * 1,8695 
 [t-5, t+5] 0,0714 ** 2,1916 
  
0,0193 
 
0,3619 
  
0,0529 * 1,9431 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0562 * 1,6826 
  
0,0299 
 
0,5583 
  
0,0462 * 1,6817 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0411 
 
1,2466 
  
0,0489 
 
1,0111 
  
0,0414 
 
1,5784 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0517 
 
1,5124 
  
0,0562 
 
1,1091 
  
0,0506 * 1,8550 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0706 ** 1,9904 
  
0,0768 
 
1,2377 
  
0,0688 ** 2,2663 
 
Relatedness 
[t-10, t+10] -0,0051   -0,1412     -0,0147   -0,3035     -0,0066   -0,2284   
[t-5, t+5] -0,0054 
 
-0,1646 
  
-0,0059 
 
-0,1313 
  
-0,0045 
 
-0,1693 
 [t-3, t+3] -0,0006 
 
-0,0190 
  
-0,0152 
 
-0,3383 
  
-0,0058 
 
-0,2194 
 [t-1, t+1] -0,0014 
 
-0,0432 
  
-0,0227 
 
-0,5597 
  
-0,0095 
 
-0,3756 
 [t-1, t+3] -0,0060 
 
-0,1745 
  
-0,0266 
 
-0,6262 
  
-0,0136 
 
-0,5156 
 [t-1, t+10] -0,0009   -0,0244     -0,0339   -0,6522     -0,0126   -0,4297   
Boom/bust 
[t-10, t+10] 0,1013 *** 3,2201     0,0255   0,5498     0,0807 *** 3,1603   
[t-5, t+5] 0,0815 *** 2,8550 
  
0,0488 
 
1,1390 
  
0,0726 *** 3,1328 
 [t-3, t+3] 0,0574 * 1,9601 
  
0,0495 
 
1,1519 
  
0,0553 ** 2,3643 
 [t-1, t+1] 0,0694 ** 2,4026 
  
0,0499 
 
1,2874 
  
0,0626 *** 2,8017 
 [t-1, t+3] 0,0624 ** 2,0829 
  
0,0532 
 
1,3103 
  
0,0596 ** 2,5624 
 [t-1, t+10] 0,0724 ** 2,3298     0,0382   0,7694     0,0624 ** 2,4148   
                                
R2 
[t-10, t+10] 0,2074 
 
0,0548 
 
0,1323 
[t-5, t+5] 0,1596 
 
0,0427 
 
0,1035 
[t-3, t+3] 0,0919 
 
0,0482 
 
0,0710 
[t-1, t+1] 0,0933 
 
0,0713 
 
0,0825 
[t-1, t+3] 0,0963 
 
0,0759 
 
0,0863 
[t-1, t+10] 0,1414 
 
0,0644 
 
0,0806 
No. in Sample   133   81   214 
* p < 0,10 
               ** p < 0,05 
               *** p < 0,01 
                
 
